

In the Company of Animals: Rethinking the Politics, Performance, and Pedagogy of a Post-Animal Public Life

Introduction

What does it mean to be *at home with, to life with, or to cohabit with* animals? Does the desire to draw the animal more closely towards those spaces or identifications claimed to be “human” produce what Heidegger -- borrowing from the poet Novalis -- describes as a state of “homesickness”: a discourse that trades and erases what is definitive of Man for a romanticized “urge to be at home everywhere,” so much so that “the city-dweller” is no longer even nostalgic for a sense of humanity proper, but has become an unhomesick “ape of civilization”?¹ And given this kind of anxiety surrounding the implications of *being-with* animals, how to proceed without also reproducing Agamben’s “anthropological machine”: that is, a conceptual apparatus that frames the task of rethinking what it means to be in the company of animals as a matter of either further animalizing human life, or granting characteristics of humanity to animals, such as language and rights?²

Set against the backdrop of intense anthropocentrism, the focus of this research paper begins with a consideration of how contemporary scholars such as David Clark, Matthew Calarco, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida and Alice Kuzniar, attempt to move beyond the “philosopher's familiar” and sketch more broadly the conditions of possibility for registering the claim of a post-animal public life that emerges in the company of animals. This paper argues that developing new constellations for thinking about a post-animal public life must begin from

three central and interconnected presuppositions. First, that a post-humanist philosophy and public life is dependent upon developing new languages that destabilize and distance itself from the normative discourse of humanism and liberalism. Second, that these vocabularies must be put to work in developing a better understanding of how, as Judith Butler argues, social coalitions and “[m]obilizing alliances do not necessarily form between established subjects,” but rather are constituted by an otherness that interrupts and inverts the boundaries and performances of subjectivity, public life, and humanity. And third, by reviewing the role of Bobby in Levinas’s “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” -- a dog who not only *bears witness* to the horrors of the Holocaust but also publicly *testifies* to the humanity of those held captive by the Nazi regime -- this paper contends that acts of witnessing and testimony demonstrate how a radical form of learning becomes enabled in the company of animals. While developing a post-animal public life requires acknowledging how animals arrive unexpectedly in our everyday lives, as well as the affects of such an event, towards its conclusion this paper will argue that learning about what it means to be *at home with, to live with, or to cohabit with* animals, is always-already bound up with a form of indeterminate *precarious pedagogy*.

I. The “Philosopher's Familiar”³

Within a philosophical tradition that has made concerted efforts to determine an oppositional limit between Man and Animal, in both “On Being ‘The Last Kantian in Nazi Germany’: Dwelling with Animals After Levinas” and “Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes,” David Clark poses to his audience an important question: why is it that the modern philosophical discourse, even in its most radical moments of critique pregnant with the possibility to think *otherwise* and always differently the question of

the animal, is a convention that all-too-often ends up resorting to and/or reinscribing the same anthropomorphic and conventionalizing schemas it attempts to break away from?

As a preliminary starting point to consider such an inquiry, it is important to introduce from the outset that Clark -- alongside other contemporary scholars such as Jacques Derrida, Matthew Calarco, and Alice Kuzniar, to name just a few -- have dedicated their academic efforts to *twisting away from* “the philosopher’s familiar.”⁴ For each of these intellectuals, what has become problematically commonplace and customary within modern philosophy is an interest to uphold the metaphysical human-animal distinction: a framework that alienates non-human life principally by viewing it as a condition of lack or privation when measured against, and thus opposed to, human life. Representing “the limit case” of the philosopher’s familiar, Martin Heidegger has argued emphatically throughout his career that animals should be understood as instances of “‘just-plain-life’” that are “‘poor in the world’”: that is, animals do not have reason in the form of logos or human *Dasein*, animals do not live with a recognition of death or finitude which causes them not to die but perish, and because animals are without self-consciousness, language, representation, judgement, or history, they remain separated from human beings “‘by an abyss of essence.’”⁵ Similarly, and in his early work, Giorgio Agamben also assumed a division between human and non-human life. But rather than frame animals as being deprived or without language altogether as in the Heideggarian sense, Agamben argued “that animals are identical with, and fully immersed in, the language they speak.”⁶ And although Agamben has dedicated the latter part of his career to abolishing the “anthropological machine” his early articulations helped to configure, he initially alleged that what distinguished human beings from other forms of life was their capacity to be “deprived of language (in the form of articulate

speech).” For Agamben, it is this impoverishment or “state of infancy” that compels and “opens human beings to alterity in the forms of culture, history, and politics” that exists outside of themselves.⁷ Conversely, and because animals can only be but submersed or swallowed up within their environments, they remain -- in Lacanian terms -- immobilized within “the snare of the imaginary” and denied “access to the symbolic, that is to say, to the law and to whatever is held to be proper to the human.”⁸

In an era that has seen a proliferation of violence being directed towards animals -- factory farming being one primary example -- the risks involved in the discourse of the philosopher’s familiar become maximal. For Clark, Heidegger’s configurations of human morality and the denial of death to the animal function as a precondition or “alibi” to legitimize a broad array of everyday butchery against animals, “that includes what Derrida calls the ‘non-criminal putting to death of animals,’ and of human beings ‘by marking them as animal.’”⁹ In Calarco’s estimations, Agamben’s premature inclination to render animals as fixed within a “code” or “programmatic,” neglects any consideration of how non-human life engages in political thought or organization, as well as “what, if any role, animals play in human political life.”¹⁰ And for Derrida, while the reasoning of Heidegger and others like him is both “sound and profound,” what is perplexing about this historic institution are the various ways in which such philosophers proceed “as if they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal.” To that effect, Derrida poignantly reminds us that “this immense disavowal” of the animal cannot “be the figure of just one disavowal among others. It institutes what is proper to man, the relation to itself of a humanity that is above all anxious about, and jealous of, what is proper to it.”¹¹ Within this context, the question of the animal not only calls

for but demands, with an impending sense of urgency, a rigorous and self-reflexive practice to think the “abyssal rupture” of Man and Animal otherwise.¹² And yet for all of that, where is one to begin such a project? What kinds of foundational levers or footholds -- a *mochlos*¹³ -- need to be proposed in order to challenge and displace anthropocentric discourses, as well as enable a shift towards a post-humanist critique and practice? Where are these efforts being made, for better or worse, within the philosophic tradition? And finally, how is philosophy today managing a double negation of risk: on the one hand, the risk of refusing to abandon the human-animal divide, while on the other hand, addressing uncertainties involved in making claims to “*move beyond*” that very distinction?

While outlining briefly the philosopher’s familiar is important, it does not address in full the question Clark proposes to us at the beginning of this section, and to which I would now like to return. Looking to Emmanuel Levinas’s famous essay “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” Clark argues that the philosopher’s familiar cannot be understood as simply a resolute rejection of the animal from modern philosophy and the realm of humanity proper. In contrast to this view, Clark argues that Levinas -- and philosophy itself -- shares a much more problematic, fraught, and emotional relationship to “the enigma of the animal”¹⁴ demonstrated principally in the form of a “double gesture”: namely, the “casting out of animals only to draw them back in, this double identification of them as radically other and relatively lacking, [that] is one and the same gesture.”¹⁵ In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” Levinas provides a rare personal account of his experiences as a Jewish prisoner of war in Nazi Germany. Under the interruptive greetings and gaze of “a wandering dog”¹⁶ named Bobby -- an animal who not only *bears witness* to the horrors of Camp 1492 but also “*testifies* to the worthiness of the imprisoned and

murdered” -- Levinas rethinks the question of everyday violence or “butchery,” of *being-with*, and of the obligations that human life shares to its non-human counterpart.¹⁷ Being careful not to reproduce or consent to Heidegger’s famous assertion that the agricultural-industrial complex constitutes the same form of genocidal violence Jewish populations experienced under the rule of Nazi Germany -- a totalizing view that neglects how suffering and violence emerges within a range of difference and *differance* -- Clark argues that Levinas offers up, alongside the “maximally important context” of the Holocaust, the possibility of “a *rhetorical* neighbourhood in which animals and humans dwell and summon each other into responsibility.”¹⁸ This mode of community and obligation, one that reengages the political and ethical implications of eating and belonging, that recalls Derrida’s question of what it means to “*eat well*,” and evokes the imperative “*you ought not kill me*,” is evidence of Levinas’s effort to in some way distance himself from the philosopher’s familiar and humanist discourse.

While Levinas confesses that he is unable to ignore, look away from, or deny the fact that Bobby’s gaze compels him to acknowledge a relationship of shared precarity, one that in a mere instant seems to unfold between a man and a dog, he remains unable to attribute a face to Bobby liken to that of the human face. For Levinas, “the face” is an attribute that can only be ascribed or viewed in its most complex expression within the “new phenomenon” of the human, whereas the animal face is something that can only be measured against, as well as “come after,” the “purity” of the human face.¹⁹ In other words, what makes the human face distinct for Levinas is its irreducible and absolute, rather than relative, singularity. As Calarco describes, both ‘the face’ and ‘the human’ represent “an *ethical concept* rather than a species concept” for Levinas: a

unique form of “expressivity and vulnerability” that, when presented *face-to-face*, “calls my thought and egoism into question and...demands an alternative form of relation” with the Other.²⁰

As a result, Levinas’s conception of a “rhetorical neighbourhood” remains dogmatically human, and ironically, works to reproduce the Heideggarian and Kantian “ethics of alienation”: one that functions to deny the animal -- to frame its existence as being in the “mode of not-having” -- as a way to reaffirm and privilege “the exemplarity of the human.”²¹ Although Bobby is proclaimed by Levinas to be the “last Kantian in Nazi Germany” and seemingly positioned as an admirable model of Kantian ideals -- a figure wholly attentive to its endless ethical duties to the well-being of Others -- Clark argues that “Levinas pays Bobby this highest compliment but [then] instantly qualifies it to the point of retraction.”²² Instead, Bobby represents “a kind of simulation” for Levinas: a creature that “lacks the knowhow and the liberty truly to stop himself from acting in a way that cannot be universalized.”²³ Inasmuch as Bobby presents a rare point in which the philosopher recounts autobiographically his being “*seen seen*” by the animal, Levinas disavows the potential surrounding Bobby’s alterity, “as if the monstrosity of what calls for being witnessed, could not, finally rest on the shoulders of a mere animal.”²⁴

In light of these reflections, Clark contends that the “double gesture” modern philosophy demonstrates towards animals bespeaks its being haunted by both a “phantasmatic animality,” or the compulsion to differentiate Man from Animal, as well as an “unacknowledged attachment to animality, an underlying and interminable *anthropological melancholia*...expressed in the form of ongoing foreclosures and erasures of the imagined animal.”²⁵ For as much as philosophy yearns to finally be rid of the pest of animality, to draw that single irrefutable line, it “*cannot have done with having done with them either.*”²⁶ Philosophy pertaining to the animal then, Clark

in effect argues, cannot strictly be read “*conceptually* for what...[it] say[s] about living creatures,” but rather “*symptomatically* [as] the site of (dis)avowed and haunted desires, of repressions and displacements that register the ways in which the *anthropos* is inconceivable with *and* without a conception of animality.”²⁷

Partly rooted in the heart of this challenge is the task of beginning again and always differently the *mise en scène* Levinas paints in reference to Bobby: this little dog who “‘unwittingly’ bears witness to the humanity of Levinas and the other prisoners, remembering what the Nazis, in their unremitting savagery, have forgotten.”²⁸ For starters, what does it mean to “bear witness,” or for that matter, to be a “witnessing animal”? How does an animal who can at once testify and witness, even if that animal is not aware of enacting those very discourses of “witnessing” and “testifying” *as such*, help us grasp the problems which are constitutive of witnessing-testimony? And how, as Clark suggests, do other ideological systems predate and “determine ahead of time the capabilities of an animal,” all the while ignoring the fact that “injustice is irreducible to inhumanity, and for that reason...and because they regard us with mortal eyes, with mortal bodies,” the promise of obligation cannot be collapsed between *living beings* or “*animals-to-come*”²⁹

II. Thinking forms of Non-Thinking Otherwise in Philosophy and Animal Studies

If the project of *thinking* the most *unthinkable* possibilities surrounding animality is to become more strategic, then the task of developing a post-humanist politics must begin by displacing what Judith Butler describes as “a form of non-thinking” in philosophy. In Butler’s definition, a “non-thinking” discourse is a binary framework that serves as a “restrictively normative model” or logic. More than this, however, non-thinking also becomes naturalized --

and dangerously so -- as a form of moral judgement that not only “falsifies the world” as a way to trace “the sign of a cultural privilege,” but also uses its fictitious sense of entitlement to legitimize any and all actions that are determined to be “necessary” in order to keep undesirables “at bay.” In the context of regarding non-human life, the oppositional limit distinguishing Man from Animal presumes under the aegis of “common sense” that each category is “singly and exhaustively determining of identity.” Within this scenario, animals are framed as living beings born into a state of privation and lack, while in comparison, the “human subject” is balanced between both “internal” and “external” features. On the one hand, a person's sense of self is often viewed as being “internally differentiated and composed of several mutually determining parts” or identities. On the other hand, and of critical importance for this discussion, registering what it means to be human has also been normatively defined *against* “other formations of the subject as well as *specters of abjection*” that are, and must remain, external to it -- such as the Animal and other icons of foreignness.³⁰ In other words, and as Clark aptly describes, “Figuring animals, we *configure* the human.”³¹

Of course, for both Butler and Clark, understanding the differential power that upholds the human-animal distinction has never been a matter of simply drawing an oppositional limit or border between the human subject and animal non-subject. Alternatively, the reason why this normative framework of Man versus Animal constitutes an egregious form of non-thinking, is due primarily to the fact that its logic prohibits and guards against any inquiry into how “the one I exclude, in order to constitute my discreteness and specificity, remains internal to me as the prospect of my own dissolution.”³² In other words, the animal is not “*out there*” set at a distance

away from the human but is, and arguably always has been, “*in here*” contouring while also making vulnerable the very notion of subjectivity, humanity, and public life itself.

Contemporary philosophy needs to go further than the “conflictual relation” separating “us” that is human from the non-human “them”: a position that, as Butler rightly suggests, has left the tradition at the point of knowing “very little about either category or sites of their sociological convergence.”³³ Instead, *thinking forms of non-thinking otherwise* must address the various forms of anxiety, melancholia, and antagonism that arise in the company of animals. As Derrida has argued at length within his work, developing a post-humanist philosophy “is *not just* a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse the animal such and such a power,” as is often the case within the discourse of the philosopher’s familiar. Thinking animals otherwise also requires “asking whether what calls itself human has the right to rigorously attribute to man, which means therefore attributing to himself, what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever possess the *pure, rigorous, indivisible* concept, as such, of that attribution.”³⁴ Nevertheless, challenging the normative logic of the philosopher’s familiar should not be interpreted here as an advocacy of collapsing difference, of “*simply let[ting] the human-animal distinction go,*” as Calarco suggests to us.³⁵ Contrary to this view, a post-humanist philosophy must begin from the presupposition of giving the greatest pause and reflection to that opposition, while at the same time undermining it by theorizing and framing life as a plurality of shifting borders, limits, conditions and peripheries. Perhaps best described by Derrida in an interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco,

If I am unsatisfied with the notion of a border between two homogeneous species, man on one side and the animal on the other, it is not in order to claim, stupidly, that there is no limit between ‘animals’ and ‘man’; it is because I maintain that there is more than one limit, that there are many limits. There is not one opposition between man and non-man; there are, between different organizational structures of the living being,

many fractures, heterogeneities, differential structures.³⁶

Echoing such sentiments, Butler argues that developing “new constellations for thinking about normativity” as a set of numerous organizational structures in the way Derrida describes, is predicated on developing both a language that moves away from liberalism, as well as rethinking the performance and spaces of sociality.³⁷ First, a central obstacle that Butler -- alongside Derrida and Calarco -- identifies as a hinderance to developing a post-animal politic, is the temptation to situate animals within the normative logics of liberalism. This occurs either by expanding existing concepts such as rights and citizenship to accommodate difference, or comparatively, by managing difference under the purview of a “multicultural” (or in this case, a “multi-species”) rhetoric. For Butler, these kinds of approaches are ineffective because, and particularly in the case of addressing the animal, the language and juridical-framework of liberalism is fundamentally under-equipped and “inadequate to the task of grasping both new subject formations and new forms of social and political antagonism.”³⁸ Similarly, while Derrida has often stated that he is sympathetic to the cause of animal rights, he takes the position that “animals cannot be placed under concepts like citizen” and rights. Such an approach would not only reproduce an anthropocentric discourse that essentially situates animals within structures that are “proper to man,” but also, it wrongly presumes that animals are free and able to enter into a type of contract whereby “they would have duties, in an exchange of recognized rights.”³⁹ Proceeding within a rights-based discourse would also falsely make the claim of being in some way representative of the “interests” of animals -- a practice that Calarco adds would be little more than a “slightly different version of anthropocentrism and subject-centrism.”⁴⁰ Finally, to embrace a post-animal politic that claims to move “*beyond*” the Man and Animal divide -- that

is, in the form of “*letting go*” or consists of a notion of politics centered on “the death of the animal”⁴¹ -- risks, at least in my preliminary estimations, reproducing a liberal discourse that positions the antagonisms of the human-animal divide as being surmountable, or even reconcilable, ignoring in full how it continues to shape public life in the present-day neoliberal order.

Rejecting the language of liberalism, an important strategy Derrida has outlined in response to the question of the animal rotates around changing the word *animal* (a term that signifies “the singular”) for *l’animot*. The phrase *l’animot* marries three central meanings for Derrida. First, *l’animot* is a term that, instead of viewing animals or the division between Man and Animal in the singular, suggests “an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals” that resists homogenization.⁴² Second, “the suffix *mot* in *l’animot* should bring us back to the word”⁴³ -- *mot* being the word for “word” in French -- as a practice that gives pause to the various ways language has been denied to non-human beings. Third, Derrida argues that his use of the phrase *l’animot* is not a gesture of “‘giving speech back’ to animals” but a way to consider muteness as something other than a privation.⁴⁴ Likewise, and of noteworthy mention, Alice Kuzniar has added to this insight on language in her book Melancholia’s Dog. Kuzniar, who is primarily taken up with the question of our affective kinship with dogs, argues that “perhaps the question should not be ‘do they have language?’ but ‘do we have an adequate language to talk to them and about them?’” A post-humanist philosophy must be willing to abandon the liberal and anthropocentric inclination to give language back to animals: a move that as Kuzniar reminds us, “betrays the supposition that they don’t otherwise communicate.”⁴⁵

Second, *thinking forms of non-thinking otherwise* is also predicated on how well these new kinds of vocabularies are strategically employed in the project of re-articulating -- that is, theorizing alternative sets and spaces of social coalition -- that occur in the company of animals. Understanding how public life is, and perhaps always has been, constituted by *a plurality of political formations and interrelations* taking place between human and non-human life, is an undertaking that Butler argues must account for two important qualifications: 1) how normative logics of subjectivity ignore the fact that alliances and the performance of sociality do not *only* take place between established human subjects; and 2) that “who counts” in the public sphere relies less on notions of subjectivity, or matters of ontology, than how state and non-statist forms of sovereignty inform the limits and conditions in which human and non-human life “become possible at all, or, rather, impossible.”⁴⁶

To be clear, some scholars such as Nicole Shukin have raised important objections against Butler’s earlier work Precarious Life. While Butler undoubtedly brings significant questions to bear on how all living things are tied together by a state of shared precarity, for Shukin, her work ends up being unable to shift away from an anthropocentric objective that places human life and the tradition of the humanities as an “ethical and political priority.”⁴⁷ And while some may argue that this criticism holds true for Butler’s latest book Frames of War -- especially given the fact that Butler only refers to examples that highlight threats cast to human life -- her text provides an important concession: that “*Precarious life implies life as a conditioned process, and not at the internal feature of a monadic individual or any other anthropocentric conceit.*”⁴⁸

In Frames of War, Butler disentangles how normative understandings of subjectivity rely on sets of “‘ontological givens’” organized centrally around anthropomorphic terms, ones that predetermine who qualifies as a “recognizable” subject, what registers as “culture,” as well as how “community,” social “coalitions,” and public life are to be understood and performed.⁴⁹ Taking a strong position against any kind of politics that “requires a certain kind of subject” -- for instance, that a subject must be human to be of consequence -- Butler brings important awareness to the question of: “What formations of subjectivity, what configurations of life-worlds, are effaced or occluded by such a mandatory move?”⁵⁰ When it comes to dissecting subjectivity within a post-humanist discourse, Butler clarifies that her use of the term “coalition” is not meant to imply forms of resolution or unification happening between subjects, subject positions, or types of identity politics. Contrary to this view, the performance of sociality between human and non-human life alike must be reframed as “animated fields of difference, in the sense that ‘to be effected by another’ and to ‘effect another’ are part of the very social ontology of the subject, at which point *‘the subject’ is less a discrete substance than an active and transitive set of interrelations.*”⁵¹ And while rethinking the limits of subjectivity is an important emphasis within Frames of War, Butler also stresses the point that precarious life is, first and foremost, a reflection on the fact that “there can be no sustained life without... sustaining conditions”; and here, conditions implies not only resources but also “reproducible social institutions and relations” that express a societies political and ethical consciousness.⁵² To that effect, articulating the possibilities for a post-animal public life must reflect upon how the fluctuating parameters of public space becomes central to understanding the various sites in which politics happens, or is prohibited from happening, between human and non-human life.

From here, and turning once again to Levinas's "The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights," this paper hopes to demonstrate not only how notions of the subject/non-subject and public/private have been normatively configured strictly in anthropocentric terms, but also how, under the gaze of animals, determining a firm separation or border between the domains of subject/non-subject and public/private becomes less viable. Developing a post-animal public life must -- as Butler suggests to us -- begin from the presupposition that subjectivity and public/private life are indeterminate concepts that overlap and converge in ways that radically unsettles the human-animal distinction, while also creating new possibilities for thinking about what it means to be in the company of animals.

III. A Post-Animal Public Life

If we return back to Levinas's reflections, how does the emergence of Bobby into the space of the camp demonstrate an interruption into the frames of normativity that govern who the subject of politics is or can be, as well as where the performance of politics takes place? What are the implications of viewing Levinas's description of Bobby not as a reinstatement of anthropomorphic values, but rather, and as Alice Kuzniar suggests, as a form of mockery that acts "as if to say, precisely, [that] the creature deemed to be 'with neither ethics nor logos' testifies to command over both"?⁵³ Although Levinas's account of Bobby registers as being "for the most part unabashedly anthropocentric," Calarco adds that "the underlying logic of his thought permits no such anthropocentrism."⁵⁴ For as much as Levinas tried to maintain the human-animal distinction, the fact that "a genuine displacement of egoism" is possible amongst human beings leaves unresolved the question of whether "we should be prepared to consider the same possibility with regard to animals."⁵⁵ Indeed, Levinas himself when pressed on the issue

during interviews proved unable to fully uphold his own prohibition of attributing “the face” to animals. In a conversation entitled “The Paradox of Morality,” Levinas’s claimed that although the animal face could only be considered secondary in relation to the human, “one cannot entirely refuse the face of the animal.”⁵⁶ While Calarco and other contemporary scholars tend to argue that it is this indeterminacy or ambiguity surrounding Levinas’s notion of the face that leaves room to consider how animals disrupt a persons sense of egoism and ethics, this paper hopes to suggest a slightly different probability: what if it’s not only the coming *face-to-face* with Bobby but also the act of witnessing and testifying to Bobby’s *publicity* that so profoundly disrupts Levinas, calling him into an alternate ethical relationship with animals?

In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” Levinas opens his reflections on “every day butchery,” the “horrors of war,” and animality by referring to the Talmudic Readings of Exodus 22:31: a biblical passage that not only depicts God granting eating rights to dogs (“This feast is its right”), but also frames dogs strictly in the allegorical sense. Unsatisfied with “fables” that “are still taking on the name of a dog in a figurative sense,” Levinas declares: “But enough of allegories!” For Levinas, the creature in these biblical passages represents a literal dog -- “the dog is a dog” -- and he confesses: “I am thinking of Bobby.”⁵⁷ Through his remembrance of Bobby and his outright protest to reduce the dog to anything other than a singular living presence in the overshadow of the Holocaust, Levinas draws a parallel between “the dog mentioned at the end of this verse” in Exodus and his “cherished dog” Bobby. He asks:

So who is this dog at the end of the verse? Someone who disrupt’s societies games (or Society itself) and is consequently given a cold reception [*que l’on reçoit comme un chien dans un jeu de quilles*]? Someone whom we accuse of being rabid when we are trying to drown him? Someone who is given the dirtiest work -- a dog’s life -- and whom we leave outside in all weathers, when it is raining cats and dogs, even during those awful periods when you would not put a dog out in it?⁵⁸

What does Levinas mean when he says that this “someone” -- a little dog in biblical verse and memory -- is able to “disrupt societies games (or Society itself) and is consequentially given a cold reception”? Is it possible that Levinas’s use of the phrase “Society itself” could refer to normative models of subject/non-subject and public/private life? And if so, what are the implications of such a claim? How does the treatment of the “forgotten dogs” in Exodus mirror and set up the work that lies at the core of Levinas’s essay: namely, to address how humans and animals alike are, or can be treated, as the subject of (in)humanity? But more than this, how can we read Bobby’s wandering into the camp and his ability to testify to Levinas’s humanness as an action not of mere spectatorship or simulation, but as an engagement that ruptures any adequate notion of public life, as well as point out how even “bare life” may prove to be political and ethical? Indeed, is such an act not already suggested to be taking place within Levinas’s very description: that the presence of the dog who “disrupts societies games” is *already of consequence* by prompting his “cold reception” within both Exodus and the camp, as well as through Levinas’s compulsion to write about Bobby’s intrusion nearly thirty years after its having taken place? In other words, can we reduce Bobby to an incapable witness as Levinas is arguably keen to do, when the very act of his witness-testimony creates the transformative possibilities to think otherwise a substantive notion of post-animal public life?

While answering these questions will expand far past the pages of this paper, an entry point into this engagement should consider the testimonial narrative of Levinas’s essay that, in Clark’s fitting description, unfolds as “a double scene of sacrifice”: that is, “first, human (Levinas) on behalf of the animal, then, animal (Bobby) on behalf of the human.”⁵⁹ In the first reading, Levinas describes how he alongside seventy other people held hostage in Camp 1492

were by “the other men, called free” treated as a “subhuman”: they were reduced to objects “stripped” of their “human skin,” “entrapped in their species,” were “without language” and “deprived of expression,” framed as nothing more than “a gang of apes” to be regulated or exterminated, fully subject to the will of others.⁶⁰ Less a public subject that is configured in “human terms,” Levinas comes to embody the non-subject whose condition of lack and privation can only best be expressed in “animal terms.” Or, differently put, what emerges from Levinas’s reflections is his reduction to a private life that is clearly organized by anthropocentric principles.

Private life in this instance suggests an existence of redundancy, disposability, and an exclusion from any kind of politically qualified life: “a dog’s life.” If private life is the equivalent of “bare life” in Giorgio Agamben’s description, then Levinas is its *homo sacer*: a figure that in its “simple fact of living common to all living beings”⁶¹ is an entity “*who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.*”⁶² And here, within the setting of Camp 1492, the aim of reducing the Jewish prisoners to a private or bare life is “not so much to stop individuals from thinking -- since that would be impossible even by the most fanatical standards; but to make that thinking impotent, irrelevant and of no consequence.”⁶³ As Hannah Arendt famously described, a man who is nothing more than a man outside of the law dwells in a condition of inhumanity, one that is completely absent “of the most essential characteristics of human life”: loss of speech, social relationships, and the right to be thought of as a “political animal.”⁶⁴ In its most “fundamental” expression of impoverishment, private life for Arendt “manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.” In the camp, Levinas is divested “not the right to think whatever...[he] pleased, but of the right to opinion,” to be listened to, acknowledged, and reciprocated by his fellow man.⁶⁵

Here we can say that Levinas experiences a traumatic reversal: no longer the subject of man who can “deliver a message of our humanity,” Levinas testifies to Bobby’s ability to publicly recognize “the dignity of the person,” reminding him “of the debt that is always open” to animals.⁶⁶ Bobby’s “morning assembly” at the gates of the camp, his “jumping up and down and barking in delight,” conveys, as Levinas says, that: “For him, there was no doubt that we were men.”⁶⁷ In the second reading then, Bobby’s capacity to testify to the humanity of the men in the camp -- even if it risks reproducing a way of acting that can be universalized -- does not take away from the fact that in this *mise en scène* it is Bobby who is the public acting subject, whereas Levinas is the private non-subject cast as the object of Bobby’s attention and action. Bobby’s arrival displaces Levinas because it radically inverts preconceived notions of sociality and publicity as strictly being “a quality of human expressive activity.”⁶⁸ But on these terms it is not only the borders defining who the subject of politics is that becomes blurred, but also the place in which politics is said to happen. If the camp is the representation *par excellence* of “bare life,” Bobby’s presence raises anew how in the darkest corners of human suffering politics and public life is possible, even if it takes place amongst the most unlikeliest of companions and neighbours. This is to say that while public life is often associated with spaces such as the *agora* (the marketplace) or *polis* (the city), Bobby’s active presence enables a communication to occur that listens and responds to Levinas’s humanness in a space of abjection.⁶⁹ And yet, while Levinas is given the acknowledgement that he so desperately desires, his whole sense of what it means to be a “human being” is fractured by this little dog, bringing him *face-to-face* with a “humanity” that he no longer recognizes.

In the act of bearing witness to Bobby's expressive actions, Levinas experiences a transitive interruption that impels him (*I cannot, I must*) to think otherwise how publicity is performed in ways that exceed its anthropomorphic prescriptions. For Roger Simon, an understanding of public life framed by qualifications that predetermine ahead of time "its conditions of membership and participation" -- or, for that matter, rests on normative categories as Butler would suggest -- ignores asking how social coalitions involve "particular ways of being-in-relation that come to bear on the conditions for the formation and sustainability" of a post-animal public life.⁷⁰ Conversely, and in Simon's definition, publicity and the public sphere:

...becomes the activity within which the meaning and unity of the relation between the self and social is at once constituted and put at risk. It implies a praxiological commitment within which one is challenged to accept the loss of what is familiar and recognizably reassuring, *a principled action through which public quality of social life is brought into being by what is outside of it -- precisely through an otherness that interrupts the self-complacency of common grounds and exposes the responsibility of proceeding without any epistemological or ontological certainty.* On such terms, the substance of 'the public sphere' is not to be limited to a discussion of institutions, sites, and spaces, but must include an inquiry into what situated practices will support listening, learning, conversation, and debate, capable of reassessing the political, cultural, and moral dimensions of the organization of public life.⁷¹

On these terms, public life is constituted not by what it defines or secures itself against, but rather by "an otherness that interrupts," that arrives or perhaps *always-already* dwelled "*in here*," leaving vulnerable "any context that can or could be dominated by the conventionality of others."⁷² The various ways in which Bobby's presence turns inside out normative understandings of sociality and politics demonstrates that these frameworks cannot be reduced to a form of certitude or fixed arrangement. As Calarco asks: "And is this not the chief lesson of Levinas's thought?" That to be in the company of animals means to be interrupted and antagonized by an otherness that, through its ability to converge one's sense of self and society, leaves open new possibilities for an "ethical experience" and interrelation? To be sure, Calarco puts forward that it is precisely this punctuation of egoism in the presence of animals that makes

feasible “a notion of universal consideration”: a performance of sociality that “would entail being ethically attentive and open to the possibility than anything might take on a face,” while also rejecting those forms of non-thinking that contour our present-day moral considerations.⁷³

Quite differently, Simon contends that this moment of interruption is not only *ethical* but also *prolifically pedagogical*. A frequently “under-discussed dimension” of public life, Simon argues that during this unforeseen arrival of the other, “*publicity becomes thinkable as the necessary condition for learning, possible when presented with a testament attempting to convey something of an existence outside of ourselves.*”⁷⁴ But is the pedagogical function of publicity and testimony not already, following Calarco, another chief lesson of Levinas’s thought? That, most importantly, “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” demonstrates how a radical form of learning is enabled in the company of animals? That for all of Levinas’s effort to reinscribed an anthropocentric discourse, his writing suggests not an erasure of Bobby but an act to remember him otherwise? And finally, that his decision to write an autobiographic and testimonial narrative about Bobby is symptomatic of an ethical and affective bond established thirty years prior? That under the hospitable gaze of a witnessing animal who testifies to Levinas’s humanity, Levinas is “forged into a relationship of responsibility and respect” that places him under an “obligation of response,” one that emerges in “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights”?

75

Bearing witness then, “demands (but does not necessarily secure) *acknowledgement*, *remembrance*, and some indication that the provision of testimony has been of *consequence*.”⁷⁶ Being a “first-order witness” to Bobby’s testimony -- that is, to view and receive his affirmation of humanity and shared precarity -- Levinas is called into an address that, as Simon describes,

“initiates a chain of testimony-witnessing.” Within this relationship, what it means to *bear witness* is removed from a mode of passive voyeurism. Bearing witness to testimony is, conversely, to be called into an ethical relationship in which one must, as Simon argues, “bear (support and endure) the psychic burden of a traumatic history, acknowledging that memories of violence and injustice do press down on one’s sense of humanity”; but also, that “one must bear (carry) and, thus, transport and translate stories of past injustices beyond their moment of telling.” Here, witnessing becomes a public and social practice that not only “endures the apprehension of difficult stories,” but also represents “the enactment of one’s relationship with others” in a way that may inform “contemporary perceptions and actions.”⁷⁷ Here, witnessing-testimony is always caught up in an *engagement* with stories, images, texts, and performances that “bear an educative inheritance to those who ‘come after.’”⁷⁸ In this sense, Levinas’s essay “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” demonstrates not only an act to remember Bobby, but also enables in Simon’s estimations “a form of indeterminate critical pedagogy, a practice of inquiry and learning in which the logo’s interrelating one’s past, present, and future social relations are subject to critique and reformation.”⁷⁹ What becomes clear in light of Simon’s reflections is that Levinas’s contemplations of Bobby do not simply recount or describe the moment that he first meets with the little dog. These testimonial images become a “force of inhabitation” that profoundly unsettle and open anew how “the past might become central to new forms of community,” founded not on anthropocentric normative logics “but formed in relation to an incommensurable outside”⁸⁰: *a post-animal public life still to come*.

Conclusion

Developing a post-animal public life is not a practice or performance that collapses the human-animal distinction, but instead poses the question of how a public life itself is a convergence of multiple frameworks or publics between human and non-human life. In this sense, a post-animal public life resists a liberal discourse that tries to encapsulate difference within a homogenizing “multi-species” rhetoric. Whereas Heidegger and others within the “philosopher’s familiar” can be read symptomatically as feeling particularly anxious over the possibility that “homesickness” can result in a unmourned collapse of the border separating Man from Animal, contemporary authors such as David Clark, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, and Alice Kuzniar, remind us that no matter how hard we try to bridge this “impasse,” animals remain at a resolute, infinite, and abyssal difference.⁸¹ On these terms, the question of what it means to be *at home with, to cohabit with, or to live with* animals is to experience both a transitive and pedagogic relationship marked by a negation of closeness and separation, love and emptiness, distress and sorrow that is (un)namable, (un)knowable, (un)witnessable, and difficult. Or, differently put, being in the company of animals enables forms of *precarious pedagogy* that is, essentially, twofold.

On one hand, to theorize a precarious pedagogy is to ask, as Butler suggests, what it would mean to take seriously multiple forms of knowledge concerning the performance and representability of public life and precarity between humans and non-humans alike. A precarious pedagogy signifies a concern for how animals are a condition of possibility from within, one that interrupts and configures our normative understandings of sociality, politics, and humanity. Moreover, such forms of learning are less concerned with matters of ontology -- for instance, the

question of what an animal or a human life is -- but rather, centers on theorizing what conditions and operations of power make life possible or impossible in the first place. And if public life is considered one of many frameworks that determines whose life is grievable and whose is not, than a precarious pedagogy must also invent new vocabularies to address the political obligations and ethical responsibilities it has to new communities and subject formations that materialize in the company of animals.

On the other hand, the phrase precarious pedagogy also signifies how education -- as it unfolds in the presence of non-human life -- is always-already itself a moral and political practice that is fragile, “at risk,” and without guarantees.⁸² As a practice of remembrance, Levinas’s short essay on Bobby makes visible how, more than just a matter of representation, this “‘touch of the past’ opens up the possibility of learning anew how to live in the present with each other, not only by raising the question of to what and to whom I must be accountable, but also, by considering what attention, learning, and actions such accountability requires.”⁸³ Yet, to “be touched by the past” necessitates the question of what becomes *unwitnessable* or *unlearnable* within such encounters? As Roger Simon contends leaning on the insights of Deborah Britzman: “Quite differently, the touch of the past signals a recognition of an encounter with ‘difficult knowledge’ that may initiate a dephasing of the terms on which the stories of other’s settle into one’s experiences.”⁸⁴ It requires acknowledging that acts of witnessing and testimony in the company of animals is accompanied and “indelibly marked by their own insufficiency.” In this sense, witnessing-testimony encompasses a “paradox of betrayal”: namely, that although testimony is caught up in the act of telling “what happened,” one can never fully represent the past or an Other, leaving “absences that, in their silence, solicit or ‘ask’ questions.”⁸⁵ Pedagogy

is a precarious act because its emphasis is less on a kind of end-orientation towards finally “solving” the question of the animal and putting the matter to bed. Dwelling with animals is fraught with uncertainty because it highlights our own inadequacies to listen to “muteness” not as a privation but as a *pedagogic tension*, one that enables the setting for learning to become viable in a diverse number of active public spheres. To ignore addressing these insufficiencies and absences, to evade our endless obligation to ask otherwise the ways we must hear the unheard, witness the unwitnessable, and speak the unspeakable, renders any kind of public life and democratic ethos to precarity.

Works Cited

- ¹ Derrida, Jacques. "I don't know why we are doing this." The Animal the Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 145-146.
- ² Agamben, Giorgio. The Open: Man and Animal. Translated by Kevin Attell. (Stanford UP, 2002), pp. 33-38.
- ³ Clark, David. "Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes." (Seminar Paper for Circulation for English and Cultural Studies 767, McMaster University. Available online at: <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/clarkcourses.htm>), pp. 1.
- ⁴ Ibid, pp. 1.
- ⁵ Ibid, pp. 2-4.
- ⁶ Calarco, Matthew. "Jamming the Anthropological Machine: Agamben." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 84.
- ⁷ Ibid, pp. 85.
- ⁸ Derrida, Jacques. "And Say the Animal Responded: to Jacques Lacan." The Animal the Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 120.
- ⁹ Clark, David. "Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes." (Seminar Paper for Circulation for English and Cultural Studies 767, McMaster University. Available online at: <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/clarkcourses.htm>), pp. 3.
- ¹⁰ Calarco, Matthew. "Jamming the Anthropological Machine: Agamben." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 86
- ¹¹ Derrida, Jacques. "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)." The Animal the Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 14.
- ¹² Ibid, pp. 31.
- ¹³ Derrida, Jacques. "Mochlos, or The Conflict of the Faculties." Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2. Translated by Jan Plug and Others. (Stanford, UP), pp. 110.
- ¹⁴ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 41.
- ¹⁵ Clark, David. "Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes." (Seminar Paper for Circulation for English and Cultural Studies 767, McMaster University. Available online at: <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/clarkcourses.htm>), pp. 8.

- ¹⁶ Levinas, Emmanuel. "The Name of a Dog; or Natural Rights." pp. 153.
- ¹⁷ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 46.
- ¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 54.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 55-56.
- ²⁰ Calarco, Matthew. "Facing the Other Animal: Levinas." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 64-65.
- ²¹ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 58.
- ²² Ibid, pp. 64.
- ²³ Ibid, pp. 64.
- ²⁴ Clark, David. "Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes." (Seminar Paper for Circulation for English and Cultural Studies 767, McMaster University. Available online at: <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/clarkcourses.htm>), pp. 27.
- ²⁵ Ibid, pp. 9.
- ²⁶ Ibid, pp. 9.
- ²⁷ Ibid, pp. 9.
- ²⁸ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 43.
- ²⁹ Clark, David. "Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal: Kant, Levinas, and the Regard of Brutes." (Seminar Paper for Circulation for English and Cultural Studies 767, McMaster University. Available online at: <http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~dclark/clarkcourses.htm>), pp. 44.
- ³⁰ Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), pp. 144, emphasis mine.
- ³¹ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 44.
- ³² Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), pp. 142.
- ³³ Ibid, pp. 143.
- ³⁴ Derrida, Jacques. "And Say the Animal Responded: to Jacques Lacan." The Animal the Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 135.
- ³⁵ Calarco, Matthew. "The Passion of the Animal: Derrida" Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 149.
- ³⁶ Derrida, Jacques. "Violence Against Animals." An interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco. pp. 66.

- ³⁷ Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), pp. 145.
- ³⁸ Ibid, pp. 146.
- ³⁹ Derrida, Jacques. "Violence Against Animals." An interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco. pp. 74.
- ⁴⁰ Calarco, Matthew. "Introduction: The Question of the Animal." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 9.
- ⁴¹ In The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue, (Columbia UP, 2009) Paola Cavalieri argues that "The primeval category of 'the animal' is at the same time the first and last stronghold of perfectionism. Only the death of the animal will allow for the liberation of animals"(pp. 40). While I admire and agree with Cavalieri that the discourse of perfectionism presents a hierarchal arrangement of the moral status of individuals and situates metaphysics as the basis of ethics, I disagree that only the erasure of the concept of the animal will rid us of such traditions entirely. My concern lies primarily in the risks that underly her argument which seems to suggest that these antagonisms can be moved "beyond" or reconciled in some fashion, and whether that approach may risk reproducing a problematic discourse of Liberalism.
- ⁴² Derrida, Jacques. "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)." The Animal the Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 41, 47.
- ⁴³ Ibid, pp. 48.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 48.
- ⁴⁵ Kuzniar, Alice. Melancholia's Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship. (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 28-29.
- ⁴⁶ Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), pp. 161-163.
- ⁴⁷ Shukin, Nicole. Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times. (Minnesota UP, 2009), pp. 222-223.
- ⁴⁸ Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (Verso, 2009), pp. 23, emphasis mine.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 149.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, pp. 161.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 147, emphasis mine.
- ⁵² Ibid, pp. 23-24.
- ⁵³ Kuzniar, Alice. Melancholia's Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship. (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 34.
- ⁵⁴ Calarco, Matthew. "Facing the Other Animal: Levinas." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 55.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 62.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 67-68.
- ⁵⁷ Levinas, Emmanuel. "The Name of a Dog; or Natural Rights." pp. 151-152.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, pp. 151.

- ⁵⁹ Clark, David. "On Being 'the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany': Dwelling with Animals after Levinas." Postmodernism and the Ethical Subject. Ed. Barbara Gabriel. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), pp. 46.
- ⁶⁰ Levinas, Emmanuel. "The Name of a Dog; or Natural Rights." pp. 153.
- ⁶¹ Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. (Stanford UP, 1995), pp. 1.
- ⁶² Ibid, pp. 8.
- ⁶³ Bauman, Zygmunt. In Search of Politics. (Stanford UP, 1999), pp. 88.
- ⁶⁴ Arendt, Hannah. "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man." The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973), pp. 177.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 176.
- ⁶⁶ Levinas, Emmanuel. "The Name of a Dog; or Natural Rights." pp. 152-153.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 153.
- ⁶⁸ Simon, Roger. The Touch of the Past: Remembrance Learning, and Ethics. (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005), pp. 6.
- ⁶⁹ Bauman, Zygmunt. In Search of Politics. (Stanford UP, 1999), pp. 87.
- ⁷⁰ Simon, Roger. The Touch of the Past: Remembrance Learning, and Ethics. (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005), pp. 6.
- ⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 7.
- ⁷² Ibid, pp. 7.
- ⁷³ Calarco, Matthew. "Facing the Other Animal: Levinas." Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Derrida to Heidegger. (Columbia UP, 2008), pp. 73.
- ⁷⁴ Simon, Roger. The Touch of the Past: Remembrance Learning, and Ethics. (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005), pp. 7.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, pp. 51.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 53.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid, pp. 51.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 5.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, pp. 3.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 3-4.
- ⁸¹ Kuzniar, Alice. Melancholia's Dog: Reflections on Our Animal Kinship. (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 11.
- ⁸² Giroux, Henry A. Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed. (Paradigm Publishers, 2008), pp. 113.

⁸³ Simon, Roger. The Touch of the Past: Remembrance Learning, and Ethics. (Palgrave MacMillian, 2005), pp. 4-5.

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 10.

⁸⁵ Ibid, pp. 58.