Week 3: Notes

Problems of Philosophy . . . . . . . Phil 1E03

Notes for Week 3: What constitutes Science?

Logical Positivism, Popper, and Kuhn; Feminism

Logical Positivism: the Vienna Circle

Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Carl Gustav Hempel, etc.
primarily concerned with the logical analysis of scientific knowledge
against metaphysics, psychoanalysis, etc., claimed that most philosophical problems were meaningless
verifiability criterion:
A statement is meaningful if and only if it can be proved true or false, at least in principle, by means of experience.

"The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly equivalent to the definition of its meaning."

(M. Schlick, 'Positivismus und Realismus' in Erkenntnis, 3, 1932).

The problem with strict positivism is that it ruled out all theoretical physics, which referred to unobservable entities, and was therefore meaningless. This led to the "problem of theoretical terms", on which more below. Hempel's position is a kind of compromise between positivism's uncompromising mission to rid science of all metaphysics, and the fact that theoretical terms such as "electron" do seem to be necessary in science, and seem to refer, at least indirectly, to something that can be scientifically verified.

Hempel: The Deductive-Nomological Or "Covering Law" Model

What is to be explained, the explanandum E, is subsumed under a general law L, and explained by that law (or laws) in conjunc-tion with certain conditions of facts C:

L1, L2, L3, ... (Laws)

Explanans sentences

C1, C2, C3, ... (Conditions: i.e. particular facts and phenomena)

Explanandum sentence E

E.g.

L = law about freezing point of salt water.
C = slush was sprinkled with salt

E = slush remained liquid during frost.

What is to be explained--the explanandum &endash;is subsumed under a general law.
But the law itself has its meaning only as a result of the particular facts and phenomena it subsumes under it.

The problem of theoretical terms:

According to the verifiability criterion, many scientific statements must be meaningless, since they cannot be directly verified. Their terms refer to things that cannot be observed, such as quarks or the id or genetic drift, that are not given in observation.

Hempel's solution:

internal principles of a theory specify the basic entities and their properties, and the laws they obey.

Bridge principles of a theory specify how the theoretical processes are related to empirical phenomena, which the theory may then explain, predict or retrodict.

Thus the bridge principles (also called correspondence rules) indirectly give the theoretical terms meaning.

Popper's Falsifiability Criterion

Popper thinks the whole enterprise of trying to determine under which conditions sceintific terms are meaningful is mistaken. The point, he thinks, is not to find a criterion for when a term has meaning, but a criterion for when a theory is scientific:

"… the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."

Untestable theories are unscientific. Examples of pseudo-science: astrology, Marx's theory of history, Freud's pschoanalysis, Adler's "individual psychology".

Contrast: Einstein's theory of gravity, confirmed by Eddington's expedition in 1919 to observe the eclipse of the Sun.

all scientific knowledge is fallible
there is no foundation
scientific method is an extension of the Method of Trial and Error

SCHEMA:

If [hypothesis], then [predicted phenomenon].
Not [predicted phenomenon].

\ The [hypothesis] is false.

--back to drawing board, free creation of theory.

The upshot of Popper's view of science is that there is no steady accumulation of facts, as the positivists assumed. Rather, new fundamental theories replace older ones when counterinstances to them are discovered, nd the facts are re-interpreted in terms of the new theories. Thus whereas the positivists had supposed a steady increase in knowledge by building it up from proven facts, Popper sees a series of discontinuous breaches, with even our most secure scientific theories fallible and liable to be disproven--witness Newtonian mechanics, unseated by Einstein's relativity. But the Logic of Scientific Discovery is the essence of science: it is the method of trial and error, the disproving of hypothesis by counterinstance.

Thomas Kuhn: Paradigms & Revolutions. . . . . . . . .BACK TO TOP | HOMEPAGE

There is no LOGIC OF SCIENCE.
Instead, there are many PARADIGMS.
These paradigms constitute NORMAL SCIENCE.
Within them, as knowledge develops, certain phenomena resist explanation: ANOMALIES.
Anomaly leads to CRISIS and then REVOLUTION: a new paradigm replaces the old one. ("The King is dead. Long live the King!")
This involves such radical conceptual change that scientists thinking according to different paradigms may not understand each other (e.g. thinking in terms of "phlogiston theory", instead of "oxygen" as an element.)

3 Pictures of Scientific Development

logical empiricism: steady accumulation of facts, theories are developed to account for them better and better, subsuming a greater number of phenomena under new general laws.

Popperianism: accumulation of unfalsified theories; new theories may account for the facts differently.

Kuhnianism: accumulation only within normal science; in periods of crisis, new paradigms will reconstitute whole traditions, including facts and phenomena.

Is there a gender bias in science?

External evidence: relatively few women become scientists; many women regard science as forbiddingly masculine.

Internal evidence: many of the practices, assumptions, metaphors of practicing scientists are sexist. (Education of women; Bacon, "penetrating Nature's secrets"; studies on male animals as representative of the species; preference for models in which organism is seen as autonomous, dominant.)

Radical feminism (e.g. Susan Bordo):

the whole emphasis on objectivity is a masculine bias.
Boys are encouraged to see themselves in opposition to the external world, competing to dominate in it.
A feminist science would abandon objectivity as a false, masculine ideal.

Liberal critique:

The problem consists in unfair employment practices, and this is where the remedy lies. Nothing about science itself needs to be changed.

E. F. Keller, Moderate Feminism:

this ignores all the internal evidence of bias within science. It depends on the older model of science as an accumulation of facts that are independent of values. But as Kuhn has shown, what goes into a given paradigm is more than just fact and theory: there are also value judgements about what is important to study, what methods are appropriate, etc. Unlike Popper, theory and method are not separate: both are selected for in the course of scientific development.