Russell. N.s. Vol.
28, no. 2.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
|Consuelo Preti||“‘He Was in Those Days Beautiful
and Slim’: Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, 1894–1901”|
ABSTRACT: Moore and Russell’s philosophical and personal paths through the early years of the twentieth century make a fascinating chronicle. Some of this story is familiar; but material from the unpublished Moore papers adds new and forceful detail to the account. It is a commonplace by now that Russell and Moore were not friends, although they maintained a long professional association. Their most intellectually intimate phase came early on, reaching a peak in 1897–99. But I show that during this period Moore developed an indisputable antagonism toward Russell, which I argue was motivated by a form of intellectual self-preservation from the Russellian juggernaut. This paper examines aspects of the development of their views and their relationship between 1894 and 1901.
|Gregory Landini||“Yablo’s Paradox and Russellian
ABSTRACT: Is self-reference necessary for the production of Liar paradoxes? Yablo has given an argument that self-reference is not necessary. He hopes to show that the indexical apparatus of self-reference of the traditional Liar paradox can be avoided by appealing to a list, a consecutive sequence, of sentences correlated one-one with natural numbers. Yablo opens his “Paradox without Self-Reference” (Analysis, 1993) with the assumption that there is a sequence such that:
Sn: “(∀k)(k > n . → . ¬ True ⌈Sk ⌉)”
Each sentence on Yablo’s list is supposed to be correlated one-one with number n. Each sentence is supposed to say that for every natural number k greater than n, the k-th sentence on the list is not true. By comparing Yablo’s construction to an analogous construction with early Russellian propositions, we show that Yablo has failed to generate a paradox.
|Nadine Faulkner||“Russell’s Misunderstanding
of the Tractatus on Ordinary Language”|
ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted that Russell wrongly took Wittgenstein to be concerned with the conditions required for an ideal language in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Given Russell’s relatively extensive communications with Wittgenstein, this misunderstanding is puzzling. I argue that Russell’s mistake rests on two prior assumptions for which he had some justification. First, communications with Wittgenstein were plausibly interpreted by Russell as confirming, rather than refuting, the belief that Wittgenstein shared with him the view that psychology, epistemology, and logic are interdependent. Second, results from these areas in turn led Russell to the view that ordinary language is irredeemably vague and, as such, in need of replacement with an ideal language. In truth, however, Wittgenstein severed psychology and epistemology from his work and saw vagueness as a surface phenomenon only.
|Sheila Turcon||“Recent Acquisitions”|
|Sébastien Gandon||Review of Stewart Candlish, The Russell/Bradley Dispute and Its Significance for Twentieth-Century Philosophy|
|Graham Stevens||Review of Stephen Mumford, ed., Russell on Metaphysics|
|James Connelly||Review of Rosalind Carey Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement|