Afghanistan

• Conflict Mapping & Analysis (I)
• Conflict Mapping & Analysis (II)
• Peace Efforts
• Solutions and Ideas
• Other Afghan Links

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Afghanistan Conflict Analysis (I):

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A field guide to applied conflict analysis in Afghanistan

Seddiq Weera, M.D., M.Sc (Production of this document was supported by: Creative Associates International, Inc.) September 2002


Executive Summary

Emerging from conflict and building lasting peace requires reestablishing normal relationships that are acceptable to all parties of a conflict. Peace-building interventions should attempt to address the context and underlying factors that trigger and sustain an armed conflict. [1] To effectively diagnose the causes of an armed conflict, practitioners must identify the variables that contribute to conflict, assess the specific contributions each variable makes, and examine their interactions. 

Creative Associates International presents this conflict mapping guide to development practitioners in Afghanistan in hopes of describing the cycles of violence on a national level, and identifying instances in which strategic interventions can break these cycles. While we have taken note of literature on conflict diagnosis, both general and specific to Afghanistan, our work has resulted from direct dialogue with Afghans at home and abroad.

The application of a conflict lens has enabled this analysis to better understand the conflict, map its origins, and identify key peripheral tensions that inadvertently create or sustain conflict. Implicit in this methodology is the explicit identification of actors who are parties to conflict and their active engagement in conflict mitigation and prevention. Conducting a conflict mapping analysis prior to embarking on specific interventions has not been a common practice in development efforts. Lack of research--on conflict indicators and the inherent difficulty in quantifying them—and uncreative and narrowly-focused methodologies have hindered effective analyses of conflict. We trust that this conflict mapping guide provides the reader with new and creative instruments with which to analyze conflict in Afghanistan.

Variables fueling conflict in Afghanistan. More than three years of study have led us to conclude that discontent, which has in turn fueled violent conflict in Afghanistan, has many root causes. To varying degrees, the following factors have played a role in creating and sustaining conflict in Afghanistan: 

• Continued threats to religion and dignity

• Ethnic repression and political exclusion

• Incompetent and illegitimate government leadership

• History of foreign intervention

• Presence of foreign troops

• Elite population’s role in sustaining discontent

• Destroyed social and physical infrastructure

• Manifestation of ethnic, party and personal interests

• Manifestation of hatred, prejudice and violent behavior

• Veteran and war-related status and wealth

• Access to small arms & The illegal black market economy

• Environmental degradation

• Migration of internally displaced persons

These issues -- which, in this study we call variables -- continually re-emerged as signposts of the Afghan reality during our analysis. It is our hypothesis that, the active and methodical exploration of these variables with the Afghan citizenry, can serve us to effectively describe the status of peace and conflict at any given time. The main body of this study describes these variables and analyzes indicators, suggesting how they may be used to frame development interventions within the context of conflict prevention and mitigation. 

Early Warning Indicators. Broadly speaking, outbreaks of violence in Afghanistan can be explained as the citizenry’ s response to: perceived threats to religion, sovereignty, and dignity; increase in severity, ethnic repression and political exclusion; foreign influence; and, public distrust in the government.

Social trends including low literacy, poverty and lack of economic opportunity are underlying conditions that can exacerbate other risk factors. 

Conflict prevention efforts should incorporate a comprehensive analysis of risk factors--assessing their potential for conflict. A systematic and sustained effort to “map” the conflict variables through interviews, discussions, and training with a broad cross-section of the population, is key to identifying early warnings of conflict, understanding them as they evolve, and responding effectively. Given the complex and sometimes deceptive nature of a conflict’s life cycle, the assessment of conflict variables must be systematic and continue over time. 

Conflict Mapping as a means to development. Conflict cycles in Afghanistan have continued for more than two decades: foreign troops have engaged in strife against the people; successive governments have proven inept and illegitimate; and, threats to survival, dignity and religion have become daily realities. For twenty-four years, ethnic repression and political exclusion oppressed the Afghan people; military and political groups focused on personal, party, or ethnic interests; economic and social structures became devastated; and illiteracy ensured that populations would remain marginal and volatile. As poverty and unemployment skyrocketed, thousands of young men took up arms as a means to survival. Law and order were nonexistent; and long-term hostility gave way to deep-rooted hatred and prejudice. 

The actors committed to Afghanistan’s long term reconstruction would be well-advised to take a thorough accounting of all of the many variables that have kept conflict alive for so long. Without a holistic understanding of the nature of conflict, development goals in Afghanistan—including the resurrection of the education and health sectors, the development of a healthy civil society sector, social and economic reinvigoration, and the development of a competent government that carefully balances Islamic and modern values--will remain unfulfilled wishes. 

This conflict mapping is only the first step—an attempt-- to gauge the nature of conflict over time. Development endeavors seeking to build lasting peace in Afghanistan should begin with real understanding of the needs, fears, and perceptions of the Afghan people. Only then will efforts will offer the potential to contribute positively to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Methodology

A community diagnostic approach was applied in gathering qualitative information on sources of tension and frustration among groups and the Afghan public, utilizing a holistic model that was derived from the public health arena2.

The first step in the design of this methodology entailed gathering information through formal and informal group discussions and interviews as well as peace education training workshops. Group discussions, workshops and interviews were conducted with a broad cross-section of Afghan citizenry including, intellectuals; political leaders; tribal elders; leading businessmen; local commanders; and private citizens between 1999 and 2002. Studies took place in Peshawar, Islamabad, Kabul, Jalalabad, Rome, London, Frankfurt, Washington, Ottawa, and Toronto. Training workshops, one- to five-days in length, typically were problem-based participatory events held in Peshawar, Pakistan and Kabul, Afghanistan. Training sessions typically included an overview, small group discussions and presentations of summary deliberations before peers. In some cases, written copies of summaries were submitted to workshop facilitators. In addition to discussing the causes and contributing factors to Afghan armed conflicts, peace education sessions covered the following topics:

• Hatred and prejudice as by-products of lingering hostilities

• The role of anger in problematic relationships

• Coping with grief and stressful situations

• Communication and problem-solving skills

• The impact of chronic hostility on disposition and relationships

• Approaches to conflict transformation

• Reconciliation across societal levels

• Journalism’s role in building peace

Peace education workshops were organized by field partners including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA); British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC); Afghanistan Education Project; the Afghan University in Peshawar; the Afghanistan Women Council (AWC); Cooperation for Assistance for Afghans (CAA); Sanayee Development Foundation (SDF); Council for Peace and Unity (CPAU); Research and Advisory Council of Afghanistan (RACA); and the Afghan Interim Administration’s Ministries of Education, Higher Education, and Information and Culture. In addition to the author, facilitators included, Professor Johan Galtung, director of TRANSCEND, Professor Graeme MacQueen, Dr. Joanna Santa Barbara and Dr. Jack Santa Barbara from the Center for Peace Studies at McMaster University and peace educators from SDF, RACA and CPAU. 

Organizing, summarizing and analyzing this qualitative information involved the following steps:

- Between November of 1999 and the Spring of 2002, information was collected from more than 1,000 Afghan men and women representing diverse ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. See Appendix One. 

- During the Winter and Spring of 2002, multiple conflict-analysis models were assessed in order to identify the variables and co-variables responsible for causing and sustaining armed conflicts in Afghanistan. 

- In the spring of 2002, determinants and co-determinants were grouped into themes, resulting in a twelve item theme-list. Through peace education sessions, this theme-list was applied to three Afghan conflicts as a checklist: 1978-1992, 1992-1996, and 1996-2001. This exercise was conducted with more than 600 Afghan men and women between March and June of 2002 in Peshawar, Jalalabad and Kabul. Conflict-specific maps and solution-oriented recommendations resulted from these sessions. 

Key variables sustaining conflict as identified by participants

The following sources of discontent were identified as having contributed to the persistence and exacerbation of more than two decades of conflict in Afghanistan. To varying degrees, each of the following play a key role in mapping the Afghan conflict:

• Continued threats to religion and dignity

• Ethnic repression and political exclusion

• Incompetent and illegitimate government leadership

• History of foreign intervention

• Presence of foreign troops

• Elite population’s role in sustaining discontent among population

• Destroyed social and physical infrastructure

• Manifestation of ethnic, party and personal interests

• Manifestation of hatred, prejudice and violent behavior

• Veteran and war-related status and wealth

• Access to small arms & Drug Trafficking

• Environmental degradation & population migration

These variables consistently reemerged as a checklist of the Afghan reality; providing an illustration of the status of peace and conflict and offering an approximate though qualitative picture of peace and conflict’s status in Afghanistan. Elaborations on each of these indicators follow in the text below.

Continued threats to religion and dignity

Threat to religion was defined as a perception of danger facing religious identity, practices and institutions. Because of the important role that religion plays in all aspects of Afghan life, a regime which is alleged to undermine religious integrity loses popular support and can even be perceived as enemy (especially by rural Afghans). As such, outside forces that disrupt or disrespect Afghan religious and social values become lightening rods for conflict.

The conflict surrounding the government of The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)3 offers a concrete example of the supremacy of issues of religion and sovereignty in Afghan conflict. As one participant put it, “While the PDPA attempted to establish a modern socialist/communist system in Afghanistan, they demonstrated little respect for the religion of the Afghan people and posed evident threats to religious identity, practices and institutions.” Group members asserted that the PDPA exacerbated conflict by trying to impose foreign values on the people of Afghanistan. Specific examples of the ways in which the PDPA was perceived to threaten the dignity and honor of the Afghan people, included by forcing rural Afghans to comply with reform and aggressively promoting the intermixing of men and women. The policies of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) were cited as generators of tension because of the degree to which they were perceived to threaten religious principles and practices. Despite his popularity during the early years of his reign, Amanullah’s political and social reforms remained largely unsuccessful. On the contrary, the absence of noticeable threats to religion, honor and dignity, an atrocious dictatorship and the aggressive promotion of foreign values, may have allowed King Zahir Shah’s4 modernizing reforms of 1963 to 1973 to succeed.

Foreign behavior and unpalatable policies play a large role in generating tension, but the effect of foreign troops is even more quantifiable. British troops were perceived as a considerable threat to religious identity throughout their presence in Afghanistan, lasting intermittently between 1839 and 1919. Soviet troops had a similar effect on people’s perceptions, and the resulting resentment was not confined to the troops themselves, but was also directed at the PDPA government which accepted their presence.

Participants confirmed the pivotal role that honor codes have played and continue to play in Afghan society. (Ghairat, Namoos and Ezat) Groups echoed the glory attached to ‘defending’ and shame connected to ‘failing to protect’, dignity and honor. Perceived threats to dignity and honor from both foreigners and urban indigenous progressive groups, prompted massive resistance. Afghans acknowledged the role of symbolism in defining ‘threats to honor and dignity’. Discussions pointed out that these threats, when widespread and continual, have not only mobilized Afghan resistance, (against foreigners and/or Afghan authorities) but also caused inter-tribal and inter-familial hostilities. 

Ethnic repression and political exclusion

Protracted hostility converts identity from a relatively neutral organizing principle or identifying label into a powerful tool towards the provocation of mass violence. Participants echoed that civil wars between 1992 and 2001, though not motivated by ethnicity, were fueled by aggression, repression and exclusion based on ethnicity. Referring to increased ethnic divisions among warring factions, a participant stated: “Ethnic, linguistic and religious fault lines, soon after the collapse of Najibullah’s government5 , turned into dividing walls of hostility among political groups.” Another participant added, “Acts of revenge (an unfortunate response to severe repression) and manipulation of ethnicity by politicians (for advancing their interests) created further spin-off conflicts and deeper hostilities.”

Examples of political exclusion included the oppression of Islamist groups by the Daud/Parcham regime in 1975, side-lining of the Parcham group by the Khalq faction of the PDPA, exclusion of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s faction by Masoud/Rabani, and the exclusion of all parties by the Taliban.

Vehicles facilitating ethnic repression and political exclusion were identified as; directing vengeance to innocent civilians, labeling and stereotyping entire ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, monopoly of power/inadequate ethnic or party representation in government leadership, denying the right to employment and access to higher education, unequal distribution of resources, unfair treatment of certain ethnicities by the constitution, and the monopoly of the media by one group. Discussions of stereotyping uncovered recent examples of wrongful labeling of ordinary clergies and critics of the Afghan Interim Administrations, as Taliban or Al-Qaida.

 

Ethnic repression is reflected in acts of violence driven by anger, hatred and revenge. Examples include the mass killings at Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997; the killings, burning of property and resulting forced migration in the Shomali valleys from 1997-1999; the mass killings at Bamyan, which were initiated in 1998 and continued until last year; and the abuse of Pashtuns in the North of Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002. Afghans emphasized that ethnic division, hatred and stereotyping were fueled largely by rival factions and intellectual groups, not by ordinary Afghan citizens. 

The 23 year-old cycle of oppression and revenge was characterized by Afghans as follows: "The party in power, by excluding sections of the population, basically facilitates oppression allowing future revenge to flourish." 

Incompetent and illegitimate government leadership

A corrupt and incompetent government, particularly when coupled with widespread repression and systemic poverty, leaves populations discontent and volatile providing a breeding ground for violent confrontations.

Afghans characterized an incompetent government as one that:

• Cannot/does not adequately address major grievances, including threats to religion and dignity and ethnic repression.

• Cannot enforce law and order.

• Cannot meet the basic needs of the people, particularly in times of crisis.

"None of the Afghan governments over the past two decades has demonstrated capability to effectively respond to crises, address major grievances, bring security and enforce law and order", noted one participant.

The risks incurred by illegitimate governments are evident when one looks at the governments of the PDPA and Mujahedeen who rose to power through military coups and self-serving councils. Interviewees expressed regret for the legal shortcomings of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, though they confirmed popular support for this agreement. 

History of foreign intervention

Afghanistan’s location, tension with neighbors and a fiercely competitive regional economic and political arena have had serious implications for peace and stability in the country. 

While Afghan xenophobia remained controversial, participants differentiated between foreign intervention and foreign involvement. Foreign involvement was characterized as development work by expatriate parties aimed at addressing priority needs identified by Afghans themselves in consultation with Afghan authorities and/or local communities. Examples of the gray area between involvement and obvious intervention include the promotion of other religions, and the pursuit of hidden political, military or intelligence agendas. 

Reflecting on more than two decades of history, Afghans identified four overlapping levels of foreign intervention in Afghanistan: 

• Encouragement and provocation (e.g., presently by several neighboring countries)

• Provision of financial resources and logistics (e.g., presently by several neighboring countries and regional parties)

• Provision of weapons, ammunition and advisors (e.g., by regional players to both Northern Alliance and Taliban)

• Provision of advisors, trainers and other fighting groups (e.g., by multiple nations between 1996 and 2002) 

Prior to the Anglo-Afghan and Russo-Afghan wars, foreign intervention was characterized as the roles of London and Moscow in setting government policy and hiring and firing high rank government officials. Significant importance was placed on

the extent and duration of interventions especially when coupled with the presence of foreign troops, wide-spread poverty, unemployment and the practice of politics along ethnic lines. 

Low literacy and global isolation were suggested as co-variables that leave the average Afghan susceptible to manipulation by geopolitical players and indigenous leaders. There was consensus that warring factions, on a number of occasions, were manipulated by foreign states while such states pursued their own political and economic interests. Examples of Afghan groups manipulating their own people in the struggle for power included the exploitation of ethnic or religious affiliations by Mujahedeen groups, who even referred to their in-fighting as a, "Jihad of Good against Evil." 

Presence of foreign troops

The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, when involved in fighting and imposing foreign values, arguably has the greatest effect on popular mobilization. Until British troops entered the country in 1839, 1869, and 1919, Afghans reacted little to the intervention of British colonialists, despite the heavy hand of the latter in matters of oreign policy in Afghanistan. Gradually increasing intervention by the Soviets from 1954 to 1977 caused tension and dissatisfaction, while the physical engagement of Soviet troops in a battle against the people, (combined with PDPA dictatorship) fueled extensive mobilization within the Afghan nation. It should be noted that support to the Mujahedeen by the West, Pakistan and several Arab nations facilitated in large part the expansion and the sustenance of the resistance. 

Similar examples of invasive practices by foreign troops include the invasions of Afghanistan by Alexander of Macedonia; Genghis Khan; and Timur Lenk, all of which involved the presence of foreign troops, threatened sovereignty and dignity, caused looting, the destruction of private property, and massive indiscriminate killing.

Specific circumstances during which foreign troops heightened the risk of armed conflict in Afghanistan include:

• Participation in conflict against the people (e.g., 1978-1992)

• Support for unpopular governments (e.g.,1978-1992)

• Threats to religion (1978-1992) or promotion of other religion/s 

• Promotion of foreign values or engaging in immoral activities(e.g., promotion of alcohol, free mixing of men and women and western style of dress especially for women) 

US and Allied troops in Afghanistan, were among the most controversial points discussed with participants. Kabul residents were very grateful for the security brought by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and had no complaints about ISAF’s conduct. 

Many Afghans regretted the need for foreign military in obtaining adequate security, pointing to failures of the Mujahedeen and Taliban forces. 

It should be remarked, Afghans were open to friendship with the US based on mutual respect and equal rights. Considerable concern was expressed about the US approach in dealing with international crises. As one participant expressed: “Americans come out forcefully only to address the symptoms, with no attempt to tackle the underlying causes; and some of their short-term remedies create more long-term harm than good.” 

A minority of participating Afghans called the presence of US and Allied troops an invasion and threat to Afghan sovereignty, religious identity and honor. Such statements sparked debate about whether these troops were involved in a war against the people of Afghanistan. Many participants warned, “If the bombing of civilians continues, it could be perceived as a war against the people.” 

When the Afghan Interim Administration was discussed, concerns were raised over a lack of ethnic balance within the administration. Afghans did not however, rush to label to Mr. Karzai’s administration as, “puppet”. One participant cited, “We have to wait and see how things turn out.” 

Expectations of US and Allies forces, as voiced by participants, can be summarized as follows:

• Resist becoming involved in promoting Christianity or other religions.

• Resist promotion of western lifestyle

• (In the words of one participant, “Development does not require wearing mini-skirts or drinking alcohol.”)

• Resist supporting illegitimate governments

• Assist Afghans in building defense and security infrastructures and have an exit strategy

The elite population’s role in sustaining discontent 

The emergence of leaders to organize repressed and severely discontent people can contribute to the momentum for violent engagement. (This is especially true when these circumstances coincide with ruthless political exclusion, and ethnic repression.) The likelihood of violence increases, participants noted, when foreign support is added to this equation6. Elites including, Hekmatyar, Rabani, Mojaddedi, Gailani and others, were cited as examples whom Afghans endured while in parallel, suffering harsh treatment by the PDPA regime and their Soviet backers. (1978-92) 

In the face of extreme impoverishment, low literacy and lack of opportunity for economic advancement, dissatisfied populations become an ideal pool of recruits. Participants noted: “Some Afghan politicians, by presenting social and economic incentives, capitalized on vulnerability among the people and have built armies to serve their own interests.” The PDPA regime, for example, drafted young men, punished those who resisted and granted financial rewards to those who fought well. Similarly, the CIA and ISI in the late 1970s and early 1980s created a mechanism that forced refugees to follow warring groups. Membership in a Mujahedeen party was a pre-requisite to receiving any humanitarian support including tents, food rations, etc. Similar techniques were adopted by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, who drafted young men and provided them with financial rewards in an environment where economic opportunity and employment were virtually non existent.

Loss of vision by elites

Participants made reference to Mujahedeen leaders expected to form a unity government and rebuild Afghanistan after successfully liberating their country from the Soviets. 

Many attribute their failure to do so to, “A loss of vision for country, deviation from subordinate goals and retreating to personal, party and ethnic interests.” As one participant exclaimed, “Instead of working for what is good for Afghanistan and the Afghan people, some Mujahedeen parties and leaders worked toward what was good for their parties and their pockets.” Some participants blame political underdevelopment and external influences for the failure of Mujahedeen groups. 

The following conclusions were drawn regarding political parties and their leaders:

• Parties should have stayed focused on the interests of the nation

• Parties and political leaders should have discouraged interference from neighboring countries (It was commented they should treat each other fairly and give priority to serving their own nation versus serving ethnicities or single political parties)

• Competition for power should be peaceful; popular support should be gained by best platforms, and optimal services should be provided towards the good of all people 

• Citizenry should have been consulted and their will respected, rather than government leaders resorting to isolationist autocratic means

• Hypocrisy should have been replaced by a degree of political honesty (Participants repeatedly eluded to hypocrisy and dishonesty on the part of warring groups. As one participant expressed, “Warring factions, out of opportunism, became democratic, flexible and ready for negotiations only when they felt weak and on the verge of defeat however, they opposed any negotiations when hopeful for winning over enemy.”) 

Destroyed social and physical infrastructure

High levels of devastation caused by lingering war in Afghanistan destroyed not only physical infrastructure and livelihoods, it also damaged intellectual patterns and behavior. Damages caused by continued warfare include the near-complete destruction of highways, government buildings, schools, hospitals, power supplies, irrigation systems, airports and houses. This was exacerbated by immense suffering, massive casualties, loss of loved ones (to death, imprisonment or migration), constant fear and despair, accumulated anger, ethnic hatred and extreme poverty. (It was not uncommon for citizens to eat grass to avoid being forced to exchange their children for a bag of wheat). As the war continued, Afghans agreed that traditional conflict resolution, decision-making, and problem-solving structures were disrupted entirely. Skilled fighters emerged as the new elite, replacing the traditional Khans, Meers, Maliks, Arbabs and wise elders. An inability on the part of warring groups to transform their Tanzeems (Mujahedeen groups) into organizations to facilitate social change became clear through successive failed regimes between 1992 and 2001. Though, resulting from war itself, in many aspects destruction supported the continuation and expansion of armed conflicts. 

Conflicting attitudes and behavior

A dangerous striving for power and resources, particularly when coupled with political exclusion and the conducting of politics along ethnic lines, became tools in mobilizing groups against one another. Atrocities committed by groups while fighting with each other flourished. Afghans identified the vicious cycle of ethnic and political oppression and revenge-particularly in the minds of warring groups and some intellectuals- as sustaining factors in Afghan civil war and as the cause of spin-off wars since 1992. As the impact of chronic hostility on attitudes and relationships was discussed, participants agreed that biased attitudes, unfair judgment, and a lack of empathy and compassion, were driving the actions of rival groups and their supporters. As a result of 23 years of relentless burning, destruction of private property, torture, and killing, compassion was lost for one another and one another’s basic needs.

Participants stated the following to be among the biases and conflicting views and approaches that have contributed to instability in Afghanistan:

One-sided claims of victimization: 
Warring groups and biased intellectuals have made numerous claims serving as a basis for ethnic hatred and reflecting only one side of a story. Independent and scholarly verification of such claims in conjunction with public awareness of the nature of these claims, Afghans proposed, would reduce inter-ethnic tension in Afghanistan.

Illegitimate means of achieving or maintaining legitimate rights: 
Over the last 23 years, Afghanistan has condemned the gross violation of lower classes by parties in power. Afghans argued that fear of an unjust future may tempt groups to maintain their illegitimate power even if doing so requires the use of force and acts of large-scale violence. One example was that of several ministers in the late interim administration who insisted on maintaining their posts due to fear of an unjust future. Afghans complained that there was no open communication within the government about such concerns and no mechanism for addressing fears collectively. 

Imaginary threats to national unity: 
According to an earlier model of national unity, “good Afghans” were expected to place more emphasis on their national identity as Afghans than on their ethnic and religious affiliations. Moreover, working towards basic identity-related rights is mislabeled as a separatist attempt in the minds of warring factions and some intellectuals. It was noted by participants that Afghans recognize and sincerely respect the right to take pride in ethnic identity, language, and the advancement of Afghan culture. The exercising of these basic rights has been mistakenly labeled as inherently disloyal to national unity. Participants echoed, exercising identity-related rights, if not aimed at ethnic supremacy and oppressing others, to be a culturally enriching process ultimately strengthening national unity.

Lack of empathy in views and behavior: 
Lingering hostility and related anger and hatred prevent sensitivity to the rights and basic needs of the ‘enemy group.’ Warring groups, their supporters, and some intellectuals, were charged by participants with suffering from a lack of empathy. Lack of empathy has been traditionally characterized as denying the rights of ‘others’, being dishonest about one's own misconduct, and excessively blaming others for their mistakes. During inter-group warfare in Afghanistan, lack of empathy has been coupled with extremes of injustice and unfairness in the form of strict political exclusion, the torturing of ‘enemy’ prisoners, denying right to employment, deprivation of basic needs, and destruction of ‘enemy’ property. Examples of such acts reflect in the treatment of the supporters of the Mujahedeen by the PDPA and vice versa, followers of Hekmatyar by those of Masoud’s group and vice versa. It is additionally reflected in the way in which aggressive Mujahid groups treated each other and how the Taliban and the Northern Alliance treated each other and each other’s cohorts.

Legitimacy and Eligibility Games: Erroneous Political Culture: 
For more than two decades, various regimes have used physical strength and bogus self-serving councils to claim legitimacy. Military victory and claims of “good service to the nation” have also been used as justifications for retaining illegitimate power. Likewise, allegations and labels such as "war criminal" are assigned only to the warriors of rival groups, without the assumption of any responsibility for accusers’ own war crimes. This hypocrisy and political dishonesty were identified as serious obstacles to a national reconciliation program, in which assuming responsibility and trying to learn from mistakes is an essential step towards the mending of broken relationships and regaining of lost trust.

Expert-Defined Problems: 
Small groups of politically active, urban intellectuals have traditionally presumed knowledge of the wishes of the Afghan people. In the absence of a mechanism for public consultation, intellectuals have introduced their own definitions of problems and issues of concern to the people of Afghanistan, and sometimes claimed to independently possess solutions. Some intellectuals focus all their attention on a federal political structure, and others fastidiously oppose such a model, but neither group has queried the population on their thoughts. Likewise, misconceptions exist regarding a strong central government versus regional autonomy and regarding relationships between minority and majority parties.

Participants agreed that lingering hostility contributes to the continuation of armed conflict in several ways. Groups develop blame and subsequent anger for each other; blame and anger lead to hatred and the denial of basic rights; (loss of empathy and compassion) and further hatred causes the categorical labeling of ethnicities. (homogenization) 

This leads to the continuation of hostility and the perception of the enemy as evil, responsible for all problems and therefore, “to be eliminated”. (dehumanization and demonization)

Veteran and war-related status and wealth

One of the factors sustaining conflict is the attempt by warriors to hold on to the wealth, power and status gained from fighting. This is particularly evident after prolonged armed conflict and holds true for Afghanistan, where government is one of the few avenues to power, wealth, and status. Ideological aspirations and love of power have motivated leaders of the PDPA government, the Mujahedeen and the Taliban to repeatedly ignore the will of the people. Participants commented, ‘Both Mujahedeen and Taliban commanders gained prominence through their military skills and success in fighting; but when the time came for transition from military battle to political and bureaucratic leadership they failed badly.’ Young desperate fighters, faced with little or no economic opportunity and encouraged by lack of law and order, became involved in smuggling, theft, looting, banditry, and enjoyed status and personal enrichment.’

Access to small arms & drug trafficking

Because of the traditional value attached to arms by Afghan society, easy access to small arms was not seen as a serious risk factor by interviewees. However, the availability and abundance of arms was seen a problem when coupled with a lack of law and order, absence of economic opportunity, worsening poverty, inter-factional fighting and drug trafficking. Afghans expressed security in cities to require security forces, while in rural communities security would be attainable if traditional communal structures were revitalized and made operational. (It should be noted that in the past, rural communities were said to receive security assistance from the central or provincial government only when local resources did not suffice.)

Environmental degradation and population migration

Three years of drought, decades of widespread destruction, and the presence of landmines, have taken their toll on Afghanistan’s natural resources. Infrastructural damage, drought, the collapse of the economy and disruption of trade have drastically worsened poverty. A resulting decline in agricultural production further destroyed an already volatile population and aggravated inter-group tension. 

Environmental degradation is exacerbated still more, by a growing refugee and internally displaced population, more than 7 million during the 1990s. This has led to an increase in poverty, lootings, robbery, banditry and murder.

Afghans did not see a direct correlation between violence and population growth, urbanization, and financing from diaspora communities. Interviewees did allude to the “ruralization” of major cities, or the migration by rural Afghans to the cities as a cause of unrest. 

The way forward

The deliverance of a peaceful and stable regime in Afghanistan is a foreign policy and security priority for many countries, crucial to regional stability and critical to more than 25 million Afghans exhausted by decades of strife. It would be unrealistic to expect that the Bonn agreement of December 2001 and more the recent June 2002 Loya Jirga agreement will cause the driving forces of civil war and instability in this country to dissipate completely. In order to maximize the peace-building impact of their activities, the aid and development communities, UN agencies, donor countries and Afghan authorities must recognize and examine the broad determinants of peace and conflict in Afghanistan and design and adjust their policies and programs accordingly.

Participating Afghans unanimously agreed conflict analysis to serve as a useful educational tool for intellectuals and political elites. Workshop participants and countless interviews underscored causes and contributing factors to conflict and mitigated excessive blaming resulting from an often oversimplified cause-effect analysis of the Afghan conflict. 

Once tested and developed further, this work can serve as a step toward the development of more precise formulae for risk-assessment and in determining the likelihood of the eruption and sustenance of conflicts. Once proven useful, formulae may complement existing “early warning systems” and guide conflict-prevention policy and program development. One could begin to classify situations according to risk, model response and sculpt carefully, appropriate development programming; changing the face of conflict resolution and peace building as we know it.

Selected References:

1. Peter Thompson, Untying The Afghan Knot: The Rising Storm, (woloo.25:1 winter 2001).

2. M. Hassan Kakar, The Afghan Political landscape, (the University of California Press, 1995), http://www.institute-for-afghanstudies.org/dev_xyz/conflict/dr_kakar_afghan_political_la

3. Paul Wehr, Conflict Mapping, (International online Training Program on Intractable Conflict, Conflict Research consortium, university of Colorado, USA, March, 2002) http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/cmap.htm 

4. David Hullme and Jonathan Goodhand, NGOs and Peace-building in Complex Political Emergencies, (Research Report for DFID ESCOR GRANT R6832, Institute For Development Policy and Management University of Manchester April 2002)

5. Date Clark, Islamic fundamentalism in the Afghan Camps in Peshawar, (WAF Articles, Journal No 3 1992. pp15-17 http://www.gn.apc.org/waf/j3p15.htm )

6. Oliver Roy, Why war is going on in Afghanistan: The Afghan crisis in Perspective, (Journal of International Affairs, December 2000-Februrary 2001 Volume V-N number 4)

7. Said Abdullah Kazem, paper presented at Ottawa conference on reconstruction of Afghanistan. Condition of Sustainable Peace in Afghanistan. (Former Dean of Economics at KU, Kabul University, November 22, 2001) http://www.institute-for-afghan studies.org/Conferences/Ottawa%20Conference%20Nov 

8. M. Ishaq Nadiri, In the Aftermath of Terror: Reconstructing Afghanistan, (Afghanistan op-ed piece for New York Times.) 

9. Noorullah Khan, Afghan Loya Jirga, (The News: Jung Opinion, May, 21, 2001) 

10. Mohammed Ehsan Zia, An Analysis of Peace building Approaches in Afghanistan, (ASIP Asian Social Issues Program, March 1, 2002) http://www.asiasource.org/asip/peacebuilding.cfm 

11. Astri Sahrke, Arhe Strand, Kristian Berg Harpviken. Peace-building Strategies for Afghanistan, (Prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 2002)

12. Catherine Morris, What is Peace Building: One Definition, http://www.peacmakers.ca/publications/peacebuildingdefinition.html 

13. Ameen Jan, Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan: The Roles of Pakistan, (Reports International Peace Academy) http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Research/PublRepoReseAfghPrint.htm 

14. Afghanistan Foundation @1999 Executive Summary, Afghanistan White Paper, (Embargoed by the Afghanistan Foundation July, 1999)

 

Appendix

Peace Education workshops, discussions and interviews from 1999 through 2002:

Conflict Mapping & Analysis (II):

Complexity of the Afghan conflict is due to: 1) over two-decade duration of active war (and its consequences), 2) involvement of too many (national and international) parties, and 3) too many issues at stake (economic, geopolitical, religious and cultural)This can explain why peace efforts that have only dealt with a few parties to address only a few issues did not succeed.In the face of a complex war such as that in Afghanistan only comprehensive and committed peace efforts that: 1) take into account all (key) parties and all (important) issues, and 2) address the consequences of the 23 years of destructions (destroyed infrastructure, damaged economy, divided society, political hostilities, accumulated anger and hatred, prejudice, emotional wounds due to desperation, fears, and losses), can bring sustainable peace and stability.Below is a summary illustration of the players/parties and the issues/agendas that cannot and should be ignored in any peace plan/process/initiative:

The Internal and External Players:

1.1 Political and Military Players (National Level):

From 1994-2001:

The Tahrik-e- Islami Taliban, which controls around 90% of the Afghan land (2001). The Northern Alliance formed of Jamiat-e-Islami of Afghanistan (Professor Rabani), Hezb-e-Wahdat (General Khalili), Junbish-e-Milli Islami (General Dostum) and Itehad-e-Islami (Professor Sayaaf).

From 1992-1994 (Inter Mujahid-party War):

Hezbi-Islami led by Hekmatyar (Pashtoon) Jamait-Islami led by Rabani and Masoud (field hero) (Uzbek and Tajik, respectively) National Islamic Front led by former communist General (Uzbek) - Shiite parties (Exclusively Shiite by religious; Hazara and Tajik by ethnicity) Three moderate parties (Jabha-e-Nijat and Mahaz-e-Mili-Islamy and Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islamy and Hezbi-Islamy Mawlawee Khalis (did not take part in inter-party fighting) Members of former communist parties, Maosits parties and nationalist parties (who may had been involved under the cover of Mujahid parties)

From 1978 to 1992:

Communist parties: Khalq (dominantly Pashtoon, rural, more radical) and Parcham (dominantly Tajik, urban and somewhat moderate) Mujahid Parties (based in Pakistan and Iran): a) Four fundamentalist/extremist parties and three moderate parties in Pakistan (Soni-Muslim) b) six religious parties in Iran (Shiite Muslim) Underground parties (in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran): a) Two to three nationalist parties b) three to six Maoist parties

1.2 Ethnic/Linguistic Players:

Pashtoon: The largest ethnic group that speaks Pashto; concentrated in the South, East and some Western and Central parts of the country

Tajik: The second largest ethnic group that speaks Dari; scattered in Central, Western and Northern Afghanistan.

Hazara: The third largest ethnic group that speaks Dari ; concentrated in Central, Western and Northern Afghanistan.

Uzbek: The fourth largest ethnic group that speaks Uzbeki; based in the North of the country

Turkmen: People of Turkmen ethnicity reside in the north of the country and they speak Turkmeni.

Nooristani, Aimaq, Balouch, Qezil-Bash: are the smaller ethnic groups; except for Qezil-Bash who speaks Dari, the rest speak their own languages.

1.3 Religious Players (on national level):

Sunni Moslem (largest group)

Shiite Moslem (second largest group)

Ismaeli Moslem 

Ahle-Hadees Moslem 

Hindu (very small groups) Sikh (very small groups) 

Jews (some remainders)

1.4 International Players/ States:

Pakistan: from 1978 to 1994 had supported Jehadee Tanzeems and since 1994 has supported the Tahrik-e-Islami Taliban 

Iran: has mainly supported the Shiite groups (and some Sunni Tanzeems from time to time). Currently, Iran supports the Northern Alliance 

Russia: from 1978 to 1992 had supported the communist government and since 1994 has supported the Northern Alliance   

India: has supported the Northern Alliance since 1994 

Tajikistan: has supported the Northern Alliance since 1994-6 

Turkey: has supported the Northern Alliance for since 1995-7 

Saudi Arabia: had supported Pakitan-based Mujahideen Tanzeems from 1978 to 1992-94. Since then, they are the major supporters of the Tahrik-e-Islami Taliban 

United Arab Emirates: like Saudi, had supported Tanzeems; presently, remains a key supporter of the Tahrik-e-Islami Taliban 

European Community: has supports the Northern Alliance since 1994 (highest level of support provided in 2001) 

United States: had supported Tanzeems from 1978 to 1992. Speculations exist that USA were supporting Taliban from 1994-1997; joined hands with Russia to support the Northern Alliance since mid-2001  

China: had supported Tanzeems during 1978 to1992-94; current position not clear

1.5 Afghan Groups in Europe, Australia and North America: Many Afghan groups have been formed in exile that advocate for human rights, women rights, peace and democracy in Afghanistan. Some of these groups are simply supporting political players inside Afghanistan; others are more independent. 

 

2.0 Issues (behind positions of the players):

2.1 Ethnic and Religious Tension (national level): Complaints about incidences among ethnic groups and claims of on injustice have created tension and (from time to time) hostilities and acts of revenge. Examples of claims by non-Pashtoons include Pashtoon (Royal family’s) monopoly over political power for many centuries (national oppression).Pashtoons, on the other hand complain of monopoly of Dari as the language of offices and instructions for many centuries (cultural oppression). Issues related to land distribution, fair share of ethnic and religious groups in the government and the type of government (central versus some kind of Federal) have always been issues of dispute among ethnic and religious groups. 

2.2 Recent Issues (national level): Poverty, extremely low rates of employment caused the birth of military prostitution. In the face of non- (or poorly) functioning infrastructure (including health, education, transportation, irrigation, water supply etc.) UN and NGOs, have only been able to address the very basic needs of a tiny proportion of the people.  

Culture of Violence:Hostile attitudes, war mentalities (attempt to win in the expense of losses by others), strict and less flexible beliefs; combined a common practice of violent engagement as a problem-solving approach have played key roles in continuation of war in Afghanistan.Attempts to defeat adversaries inevitably mean that one denies the legitimate rights and basic needs of rival (political, ethnic or religious) groups.  Lack of empathy to such extent has coincided with strong belief in one-party dictator government. Dictator regimes, due to their inherited flaw, in addition to denying the right of people to decide on their future, had to use violence and oppression to silence their critics.A vicious cycle of attitudes, mentalities and behaviour as above kept Afghans occupied in non-cooperative thinking and destructive actions.Endless blames and exaggerated labels assigned to one another by Afghan group is based on distorted images of realities and accumulation of anger, hatred and prejudice. Culture of violence in Afghanistan during the last decades has mostly been complemented by a structure of violence, which is a corrupt, unjust and dysfunctional government/ruling body.

Ethnic and religious hatred and prejudice: Divisions along along ethnic and religious lines may have resulted from politicization of ethnicity, language and religion; biased analysis and propaganda by some Afghan intellectuals and perhaps crimes committed in Kart-e-Sae, Mazaar and Bamian; and foreign interferences.Even though, the degrees of ethnic hatred and prejudice vary across Afghans, it is obvious that general public is less affected than politically motivated Afghans.Not many of those who carry the burden of ethnic/linguistic/religious hatred realize that it is one thing to advocate for justice, equity and fairness and totally another thing to stereotype an entire ethnic/linguistic/religious group by promoting biased information, exaggerations and overgeneralizations.It is very likely that prejudiced and biased views, judgments and analysis may have prevented peaceful negotiations, blocked the will to share power and stopped the parties from being fair and just to one another.

2.3 Regional and International Issues: There are concerns, fears and interests that are believed to be the driving forces behind the current unhealthy competitions among regional and other countries that are involved in Afghan political and military developments.  It is important to realize that present competitions that have caused huge human costs to Afghanistan can be and should be converted to a healthy cooperation. List of countries:

Pakistan: Pakistan's position has a lot to do with its problems with India, concerns over Durand Line, and access to the Caspian oil and Central Asian market.Some speculate that Pakistan is after a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan, which will 1) put behind the historical border dispute with Pakistan, 2) allow Pakistan an easy access to Central Asia, 3) ensure economic benefit from Afghanistan for Pakistan, 4) serve as a military ally of Pakistan. Religious groups in Afghanistan have been the choice of Pakistan for achieving such a goal. Pakistan has legitimate fear of isolation, in case of a pro- Russia –Iran and –India government in Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan supports the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Iran: Iran’s unease has to do with the increasing influence of Soni Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Saudis (through Taliban government) in Afghanistan. Iran is interested in accessing the resources and markets in the Caspian and quite annoyed by a possible extension of a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan.Iran is also concerned about the rights of Shiite minority in Afghanistan. Presently, Iran supports the Northern Alliance. 

Central Asian republics: Like Russia, the Central Asian republics are concerned about their own Muslim populations and their radicalization. Tajikistan, in alliance with Russia supports the Northern Alliance. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, by remaining less involved in the Afghan rivalry, are trying to avoid reestablishment of Russian military influence in their territories. While Uzbekistan has maintained an unclear position, Turkmenistan has extended its diplomatic support to the Taliban.This support may be stemmed from the pipeline project between Pakistan-America-Turkmenistan and fear from potential Russian influence. 

Saudi Arabia: Saudi (state or non-state) sources are believed to support Sunni and Anti-Iranian forces in Afghanistan. In addition to ideological interest as promoting Wahaby faith, Saudi (along with the UAE) had) played the role of a US ally in the region to influence Afghan developments.

China: China has fear of spread of Islamic fundamentalism into its territory.China has been closely and carefully observing Afghan developments to make sure that political and military changes do not affect regional balance against China.  China is a key member of the developing military coordination among Russia, China and India against expansion of NATO and AMPO (US-Japan Security Treaty, 1996)

India: as an enemy to Pakistan, India has concerns about a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan and therefore supports Afghan groups that are not pro-Pakistan or against Pakistan.

 Russia: Russia has serious concerns about further provocations of and support to its own Muslim populations.  As a leader of the three country military development in the wake of Cold-War II, Russia tries to counter NATO and AMPO’s expansion in Euro-Asia as well as increasing economic involvement of US in the Caspian.

United States: Like Russia and European countries, US are concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and its military implications for US and its allies (bombing and possible access to nuclear weapons) as well as possible influence of Iran or Russia in Afghanistan.To prevent Iranian influence in during Afghan-Soviet war, the US granted a free hand to Pakistan to manipulate the situation in Afghanistan. It is speculated that US may have been a supporter of the Taliban through its regional allies, Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Presently, US are exploring various tracks that can bring about a regime, which does not promote Islamic extremism and will support economic endeavours in the region that will be of benefit to the US.A friendly competition between European countries and United States over accessing resources in the Caspian may be an explanation for lack of coherence in US-Europe positions on Afghanistan.  

 

PEACE EFFORTS

1.0 UN and International Peace Efforts

1.1 The United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) is the office of the special Envoy of the United Nations led by a special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations.UNSMA was established in 1993, with the main task of mediation between the warring factions through its Head (Professor Frances Vendrel in 2000-2001) and four regional offices inside Afghanistan. The special representatives have held several rounds of negotiations and mediations resulting in short-term cease-fires, exchange of prisoners and transient agreements on some principles. In retaliation to the UN Sanction, the Taliban closed the regional offices of UNSMA in June 2001.  

1.2 Six plus Two (Friends and Neighbours of Afghanistan): This group includes six neighbouring countries to Afghanistan namely Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and China; and Russia and United States of America. Objective of this group is to find a peaceful solution for the Afghan conflict.The group has met more than once every year in absence of any representation from Afghans. 

1.3 Short-term initiatives undertaken by neighbouring and other countries but with no serious follow-up. Examples include many attempts by Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Switzerland, Japan, England and Germany.These initiative have taken place in the form of hosting talks, proposing peace plans, supporting peace seminars, workshops and conferences.  

1.4 Canadian McMaster University's Peace Education Initiative: Funded by Canadian CIDA, activities of this project include: 1) Facilitating peace workshops with over one hundred Afghan politicians and leaders (February 2001, Peshawar), 2) Production of a peace manual (for parents and teachers), 3) Development of storybooks (for children), and 4) Holding workshops on reducing hatred, prejudice and hostility.Copies of the project report, the peace manual and the storybooks will soon be available on this site. A follow-up four-year project on ‘national consultation and regional cooperation for peace in Afghanistan’ is being submitted for funds.

 

2.0 Afghan Peace Efforts

2.1 Rome Process: Led by the former King Zahir Shah, the Rome process has gathered a group of key Afghans including intellectuals, tribal leaders, former bureaucrats, former politicians. This group is advocating a great council (Loya Jirga) as a mechanism to allow people to decide on the future of their country through a constitution and election. The agenda this group advocates has gained approval of some neighbouring countries, the United Nations and the United States' Congress. 

2.2 Cyprus Process: This is a parallel to the Rome process with more influence from Jihadi Tanzeems such as Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan and Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (Hekmatyar) 

2.3 National Council for Understanding and Unity (Shura-e-Tafahum): Originally established in early 90s to mediate between warring factions. Its founder General Katawazee was assassinated in 1997. Mr. Ishaq Gailani took over the leadership of the council subsequent to death of General Katawazi.In year 2000, Haji Dost Mohamad a tribal leader was elected by the council to replace Mr. Ishaq Gailani. This organization has been advocating for a representative broad-based government. 

2.4 Cooperation for Peace and Afghan Unity (CPAU): CPAU is a well-known NGO to Afghans in Peshawar, Pakistan and some provinces of Afghanistan for their successful training in conflict resolution and the interface between humanitarian aid and peace-building.CPAU provides training to teachers and school administration in more than 30 Afghan schools in Peshawar.CPAU has conducted peace education workshops in Herat and Logar, Afghanistan  

2.5 Research and Advisory Council of Afghanistan (RACA):  RACA has run university level courses on conflict resolution and published peace education materials on a regular basis.RACA has accumulated over five years experience in peace education in the Afghan

2.6 Afghanistan Women's Council: AWC was established in 1993 to: Secure civil and social rights of women based on the principles of Islam and culture and traditions of Afghanistan, Create understanding, cooperation and perfect harmony among the Afghan women on issues of national and international importance, Secure the proper place of women in the Afghan society. Encourage and promote education of Afghan women at the national level, Improve the social, economic, health and cultural conditions of the Afghan women, Establish friendly relations with similar organizations in Muslim and Non-Muslim countries.

2.7 Council for Cooperation in Afghanistan (CCA): A development organization, which has a Human Rights branch. CCA advocates human rights; organizes seminars and conferences on the rights of women, children and gathers data on human rights abuses. 

 

SOLUTIONS & IDEAS

Given the complexity of the Afghan conflict (see above) a comprehensive and committed
peace process is required to address the Afghan crises in the context of regional geopolitics. 
Here are some ideas (required time: 5 years): 

1. Initiate a process of national consultation consisting hundreds of dialogues and workshops combined with conflict transformation, reconciliation and hatred-reduction training with the aim of preparing Afghans intellectually and compiling a Peace and Reconciliation Platform. This platform should be a summary
of all the problems identified and solutions proposed by a broad range of Afghans including political, military, social and non-governmental groups as well as grass roots and village councils/Shuras.

2. Use the above process to assist the Afghan peace groups to collaborate in a peace coalition. This Peace Coalition should become a strong national basis for peace, rebuilding and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

3. Initiate a network of intellectuals and businesspersons from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries to promote economic cooperation in Central and South Asia (following the example of European Community). This cooperation can initially be explored among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.

4. Based on wide-spread consultations and dialogues, draft a agenda for regional cooperation and stability and lobbying the states to sign and ratify it (following the example of the Landmine Treaty).

5. Hold international conferences to address both peace for Afghanistan and economic cooperation for the region. 

 

OTHER AFGHAN LINKS 

• Books on Afghanistan
• Afghanistan Online
• FAS - Intelligence Resourse Program
• The Famine of the World Forgotten
• Afghanistan Peace Association
• Association for Peace and Democracy for Afghanistan
• Save the Children of Afghanistan