

“Destabilizing Chile: The United States and the Overthrow of Allende”\*

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**State Terror in Latin America I**

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A few days after General Augusto Pinochet toppled the Salvador Allende government, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger complained to President Richard M. Nixon about the “bleeding” press, which had failed to celebrate the Chilean coup. “In the Eisenhower period,” he grumbled, “we would have been heroes.”<sup>1</sup> Kissinger’s comment invites comparison of the 1973 coup in Chile with the 1954 coup in Guatemala. In both cases, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched covert operations against democratically elected governments whose leftist and nationalist policies clashed with U.S. commercial interests. The outcome was also generally the same in both countries: brutal anticommunist dictatorships which implemented neoliberal counterrevolutions that restored the local elite to power and promoted foreign investment. In retrospect, the coups in Guatemala and Chile have come to represent some of the worst excesses of U.S. cold war imperialism in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>2</sup>

Despite these obvious similarities, historical assessments of these two coups differ dramatically. In Guatemala, as is now well documented, Washington directed the counterrevolution from beginning to end, even taking such blatant precautions as flying Colonel Castillo Armas into Guatemala City on a U.S. embassy plane. In Chile, U.S. responsibility for Allende’s downfall appears far less certain. Former Nixon administration officials, such as Henry Kissinger, claim that the United States played no role whatsoever in the planning or execution of the coup led by Pinochet. Allende brought ruin upon himself, according to this version, by alienating the population through censorship and unsound economic policies. The Chilean revolution was such a colossal failure that the military finally had to intervene in order to restore law and order.<sup>3</sup> Allende's supporters and various leftist scholars, by contrast, insist that U.S. policies helped undermine a government that otherwise would have survived, and possibly

would have become a successful socialist model for other Latin American countries.<sup>4</sup> Naturally, many interpretations falling between these two extremes are possible. Identifying the exact mix of international, regional, national, and domestic factors that produced the military coup in Chile remains a central task, perhaps even more so as new archival evidence becomes available.

The debate about Chile is not merely academic; the families of Pinochet's victims continue to press for the legal prosecution of the general and former Nixon administration officials, such as Henry Kissinger, for crimes against humanity. From 1999 to 2000 the Clinton administration released thousands of U.S. declassified documents so that the public "may judge for itself the extent to which U.S. actions undercut the cause of democracy and human rights in Chile."<sup>5</sup> This essay assesses the Chilean episode using these records, including the Nixon presidential materials housed at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Especially valuable have been the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations (known as the "Kissinger telcons"), and the U.S. State Department Freedom of Information Act website, which contains tens of thousands of U.S. declassified documents produced by various government agencies, including the State Department, CIA, the National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Relying on this avalanche of new evidence to understand what happened in Chile poses special challenges. Many of the declassified documents are so heavily censored that they are difficult to comprehend. Although diplomatic historians are fairly accustomed to navigating through such "sanitized" texts, the U.S. documentary record on Chile is unusually fragmented because so many of the documents contain highly sensitive material about CIA operations.<sup>6</sup> Another difficulty is that the sheer preponderance of U.S. sources can lead investigators into becoming locked in the Washington

mind set while ignoring the Chilean setting. Given that research for this project is only about one-third complete, this brief progress report does not attempt to tell the entire story of the coup, but rather speculates on selected controversies, such as why the Nixon administration intervened in Chile, the effectiveness of the destabilization campaign, and why it took so long to dislodge Allende from the presidency.<sup>7</sup>

On the question of motive, it appears that the U.S. executive branch sought to check Allende for pretty much the same reasons that Eisenhower removed Arbenz nearly twenty years earlier. Chile, like Guatemala, was depicted as a potential base for the spread of communism throughout the hemisphere. Nixon invoked the domino theory when he told Kissinger: If Allende “can prove he can set up a Marxist anti-American policy others will do the same thing.”<sup>8</sup> In both Guatemala and Chile, U.S. commercial interests needed to be defended from nationalization. In 1970 the CIA warned that “\$800 million were at stake in Chile,” of which one-third was insured by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation.<sup>9</sup> Racist and paternalistic images, deeply rooted in the history of U.S. diplomacy, also helped justify intervention in Chile. “The Latin temperament is rather volatile by nature” and “does not promote peaceful developments,” Kissinger informed Nixon in 1969.<sup>10</sup> U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry referred to Chile in his dispatches as a “coffee klatch” and he once disparaged the Chilean army as a “bunch of toy soldiers.”<sup>11</sup> Nathaniel Davis, Korry’s replacement, compared the plight of American businessmen in Chile to the “Conestoga wagon days,” when the pioneers were “surrounded in the desert by hostile Indians.”<sup>12</sup>

U.S. officials also seemed to have wildly exaggerated the communist threat in Chile, just as they had done earlier in Guatemala. Ignoring Allende’s frequent speeches calling for a

“Chilean road” to socialism, Ambassador Korry alerted Washington before the 1970 election that an Allende government would “would not differ significantly in international policy or style from most communist regimes.” Korry regarded Allende's campaign platform as “more extremist than Castro's in 1958,” and he depicted the Chilean Communist Party as “totally loyal to Moscow.”<sup>13</sup> Under Allende, one high level policy paper predicted, Chile would become a “staging ground for subversives in other countries.”<sup>14</sup> Even after Allende gained the presidency in a democratic election and stated publicly that he would scrupulously respect the Chilean Constitution and international law, U.S. officials continued to depict Allende as an anti-American communist dictator who would transform Chile into a Soviet-style gulag. Few of those who concocted these worse case scenarios ever complained about the excesses of the Pinochet dictatorship. The double standard, of course, is easily explained by the fact that Pinochet was, to borrow a familiar phrase from the Eisenhower era, “our s.o.b.”<sup>15</sup>

A prevalent theme appearing in the historical literature on the Chilean coup is that the Nixon administration conspired with U.S. based multinational corporations, namely International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), to bring Allende down, just as the United Fruit company in Guatemala had masterminded the coup against Arbenz.<sup>16</sup> In this case, the main motive was to prevent the expropriation of ITT's Chilean holdings, allegedly worth more than \$150 million.<sup>17</sup> This theory of the coup gained notoriety after U.S. newspaper columnist Jack Anderson published leaked memos of conversations between ITT executives and high level Nixon administration officials about how to stop Allende from becoming president.<sup>18</sup> U.S. declassified documents reveal that the Nixon administration clearly sympathized with the plight of U.S. corporations in Chile that faced expropriation threats from the Allende administration.

U.S. officials, including Nixon himself, did confer frequently with ITT about Allende. But the most that the CIA would do was to help ITT channel several hundred thousand dollars in campaign contributions to Jorge Alessandri of the National Party. The agency feared that deeper involvement of ITT in its covert operations risked exposing the U.S. hand.<sup>19</sup> In short, U.S. corporations did not push a reluctant Nixon administration into intervening in Chile; the CIA had a long history of attempting to influence Chilean politics before ITT approached the agency in July 1970. Perhaps more important, the Anderson revelations essentially forced Allende to expropriate ITT's Chilean subsidiaries without compensation in order to appease his leftist supporters. "Given the things ITT had done," Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier explained to the State Department in May 1972, "the Chilean Government could not go on negotiating with them as it had before."<sup>20</sup>

Nixon administration officials unanimously opposed Allende but they did not always agree on whether or even how he could be stopped. According to many studies, when the "spoiling campaign" to prevent Allende from being elected failed, U.S. officials turned toward fomenting a military coup. As was later revealed in U.S. congressional hearings headed by Senator Frank Church, these strategies became known as Track I and Track II, respectively.<sup>21</sup> Peter Kornbluh of the National Security Archive has observed that the distinction between Track I and II is somewhat artificial; both tracks ran concurrently and they ultimately relied on a military solution because constitutional means did not exist to stop Allende from gaining the presidency.<sup>22</sup>

The blurring of Tracks I and II reflects the general bureaucratic chaos that seems to have pervaded the Nixon administration's handling of Chilean affairs. At the center of the vortex

stood Edward Korry, an eccentric ambassador whose inconsistent advice and erratic behavior frustrated the White House. Top officials frequently questioned Korry's sanity; Kissinger was terrified that the "nutty" ambassador might "write a long expose" of the 40 Committee's deliberations.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the large number of agencies guiding U.S. policy on Chile, which included the CIA special task force, 40 Committee, Interdepartmental Group, and Senior Review Group of the National Security Council, increased the danger of leaks. Nixon and Kissinger generally distrusted the State Department, which remained pessimistic about the chances of overthrowing Allende. Nixon purposely kept Ambassador Korry and members of the 40 Committee in the dark about Operation FUBELT, the CIA codename for the main Track II covert operation.<sup>24</sup>

Regardless of how these early anti-Allende plots were concocted, they all failed because Chileans refused to comply with U.S. demands and expectations. Korry mistakenly predicted that Alessandri would beat Allende, when in fact Allende, who ran under the Popular Unity coalition, narrowly defeated Alessandri by a one percent margin. According to the Chilean Constitution, when no candidate received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean Congress decided between the first and second place finishers. Traditionally, the presidency went to the candidate with the highest number of votes. The sudden prospect of an Allende victory panicked Washington.<sup>25</sup> Nixon administration officials fumed at the audacity of Chilean citizens for electing a leader who openly challenged U.S. hegemony. In his now famous justification for intervening in Chile, Kissinger lectured the NSC: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."<sup>26</sup> Korry blamed Allende's victory on the Chilean right, which had "blindly and greedily pursued its interests,

wandering in a myopia of arrogant stupidity.”<sup>27</sup>

Between the election (September 4) and the congressional runoff (October 25), U.S. officials devised unwieldily “Rube Goldberg” schemes requiring military intervention followed by the reelection of the existing president, Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party. These “contraptions” all failed because U.S. officials were unable to persuade Frei to give the military the green light.<sup>28</sup> The Nixon administration then fell back on a “destabilization” campaign that represented the cornerstone of the U.S. policy toward Chile during the entire Allende presidency.<sup>29</sup> “Not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende,” Ambassador Korry informed Chilean Defense Minister Sergio Ossa. “Once Allende comes to power,” he emphasized, “we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and [poverty].”<sup>30</sup> David Philips, who headed a special CIA task force on Chile, instructed his team that “every plot, however bizarre” must be explored to prod the military into action.<sup>31</sup>

As part of Track II planning, the U.S. embassy had long kept close tabs on the Chilean military, as did the CIA Station, in order to identify potential leaders who could be recruited to lead a coup. Unfortunately for the Nixon administration, no such individual existed. Younger noncommissioned officers generally supported Allende, who promised the military higher salaries, more benefits, and a role in the new government.<sup>32</sup> Even more conservative senior military officials, who generally disliked Allende, did not want to break the historical Chilean tradition of respecting the constitutional process. In early May 1970 the commander and chief of the Chilean armed forces, General Rene Schneider, publicly stated that the military would abide by the decision of the congress in the event of a congressional runoff.<sup>33</sup> The Nixon

administration eventually decided that the only way to overcome the “Schneider doctrine,” as this proclamation became known, was to eliminate Schneider himself.

U.S. officials hoped that with Schneider out of the way, a “coup climate” could evolve, but they were badly mistaken. Nixon, against Korry’s advice, authorized the CIA to help organize a group of conspirators led by General Robert Viaux. Kissinger insists in his memoirs that he turned off this operation by October 15, but declassified documents reveal that he was motivated by second thoughts about FUBELT’s viability, not its morality. The following day, the CIA issued instructions to its operatives in the Chile that “it is a firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown in a coup” so long as the “American hand” is kept “well hidden.”<sup>34</sup> Unfortunately for Washington, events had already begun to spin out of control. The CIA armed another group of conspirators led by General Valenzuela who bungled an attempt to kidnap Schneider on October 19. A few days later, another group of conspirators, probably acting under Robert Viaux’s orders, stopped Schneider’s car and shot him three times at close range. Schneider died a few days later on the operating table, but instead of his death establishing a “coup climate,” as the CIA expected, a wave of revulsion swept across all sectors of Chilean society, including the armed forces. Allende assumed the presidency on October 24 uncontested, as the CIA scrambled to cover up its tracks. U.S. complicity was never officially proved, but Chilean newspapers published numerous stories alleging CIA involvement in Schneider’s assassination.<sup>35</sup>

Although Track I and II had clearly failed, the Nixon administration never abandoned its destabilization strategy. Shortly after Allende’s inauguration, the CIA predicted that the Chilean economy would continue to decline, and as Allende’s failures became more evident, “a coup

climate will begin to materialize.”<sup>36</sup> The trick was to create “dire economic conditions throwing the country into chaos,” while finding a strong military leader supported by most of armed forces and a “sizable segment” of the public. Otherwise, U.S analysts warned, a military coup could trigger a civil war.<sup>37</sup> The NSC discussed ways to accomplish this objective in early November 1970. Secretary of State William Rogers speculated that an “economic squeeze” might bring down Allende, and President Nixon suggested selling off the U.S. copper stockpile to drive down the world price of copper, Chile’s major source of foreign exchange. Even though the legality of such a tactic question was raised, Nixon insisted that this “could be the most important thing we do.” Chile was not like Romania or Yugoslavia, an Eastern European region where the United States had little power. “Latin America is ours,” he declared, “and we want to keep it.”<sup>38</sup> Soon after this discussion, Kissinger issued National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93 to “maximize pressures on the Allende government.” The Nixon administration would be “cool and correct” toward Allende, but also try to isolate Chile from other Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Argentina. On the economic front, the goal was to “bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile.” U.S. economic aid and existing financial guarantees of private businesses would be also reduced or terminated.<sup>39</sup>

In practical terms, NSDM 93 meant that the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Export-Import Bank, which had supplied hundreds of millions of dollars in credit to the Frei administration, abruptly halted all loans except for small amounts remaining in the pipeline. Washington also attempted to discourage the Inter-American Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as many European creditors from providing Chile debt

relief. Because the Chilean economy had become so dependent on foreign loans to prop up its economy, the sudden drop in foreign aid surely contributed to Chile's balance of payments difficulties, which plummeted from a surplus of \$91 million to a deficit of \$253 million between 1970 and 1973.<sup>40</sup>

Making "the economy scream," however, took longer than most U.S. officials anticipated. A special U.S. National Intelligence Estimate predicted in August 1971 that "No matter how artfully Allende deals with the economic problem, he will probably not be able to maintain for very long an increased flow of those consumer goods which the underprivileged classes are now beginning to enjoy. His popularity seems almost certain to decline as the economic problems set in."<sup>41</sup> Yet a year and a half later (only six months before the coup), Allende's Popular Unity surprised everyone by winning 43 percent of the vote in the Congressional elections of March 1973, nearly 7 percentage points higher than the coalition had won in the 1970 presidential election. Evidently, the economic problems of the Allende administration did not automatically translate into opposition votes, as the Nixon administration had expected.

Allende survived as long as he did for many reasons. First, Allende himself proved to be a highly skilled political leader who knew how to maneuver through an extremely polarized political landscape. During the election campaign, Ambassador Korry observed that Allende had mastered the "Vince Lombardi tactics . . . of fundamentals," which included door-to-door campaigns; promises of free school lunches and cheaper medicine; and "bread-and-butter" appeals to the population.<sup>42</sup> Allende never would have been elected or stayed in office as long as he did without the widespread grass roots organizing efforts of dozens of popular organizations, labor unions, and leftist parties. At the same time, Allende's ability to govern was hampered by

extreme divisions on the left. Militant organizations such as the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria de Chile (MIR), which advocated direct action, clashed with the Chilean Communist Party, which sought to moderate the pace of the revolution. The CIA tried to exacerbate these splits by funding leftist fringe groups as well as the opposition parties, but it is extremely difficult to determine the effectiveness of these efforts. It appears that Nixon made so much money available to the CIA that the agency lacked much of an incentive to produce an accurate accounting. Some of the operations seem to acquire a life of their own, as large sums were approved with no more than a one line memo.

Even though Allende knew that he was being targeted by the Nixon administration, he continued to insist that he was not anti-American.<sup>43</sup> As one U.S. intelligence report conceded: Allende opposes U.S. monopolies that have “deformed the Chilean economy,” but he still speaks of the United States in “relatively moderate tones.”<sup>44</sup> Before Allende was elected, the U.S. embassy incorrectly predicted that Allende would expel U.S. cultural and educational missions.<sup>45</sup> In fact, he welcomed organizations such as the Peace Corps, which he considered a group of “fine, idealistic young men.”<sup>46</sup> Allende did eventually become angry with Korry, but it was only because he believed that the ambassador’s reports had distorted Allende’s image in Washington. He resented being compared to a “khaki-clad guerrilla coming down from the mountains with rifle in hand,” especially when his goal was to establish a “Chilean-style reformist regime, not patterned after Cuba, Russia or Czechoslovakia.”<sup>47</sup> Allende lamented the withdrawal of U.S. military installations from Easter Island, and he became annoyed when the Nixon administration cancelled a scheduled visit to the port of Valparaiso by a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. When Korry announced he was leaving Chile, Allende begged him to stay, insisting that he

“never, never, never” said a bad word against him or Nixon.<sup>48</sup> These reactions suggest not a demagogue who reviled in Yankee bashing as did Castro, but a leader sincerely eager to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the United States.

Although Allende’s charm was obviously lost on most Nixon administration officials, he seems to have been greatly admired both within Chile and throughout Latin America despite the U.S. disinformation campaign.<sup>49</sup> As the Church Committee hearings revealed, the CIA poured tens of millions of dollars into a propaganda campaign to undermine Allende’s image within Chile and abroad. This campaign ranged from providing direct subsidies to right-wing newspapers, such as *El Mercurio*, to the dissemination of anticommunist propaganda through radio, magazines, and television. Like the funding of political parties, the impact of U.S. propaganda is difficult to judge.<sup>50</sup> It is tempting to speculate that Allende’s attempts to control the media help explain how he was able to remain so popular throughout his term. Yet Kissinger’s claim that Allende established a “network of sympathetic organizations and groups that cover the globe, carrying out terrorist outrages or financing them, transferring weapons, infiltrating the media, seeking to sway political processes” actually better describes the Nixon administration’s propaganda campaign against Allende rather than the reverse.<sup>51</sup> By the standards of the Pinochet era, Allende’s censorship policies seem mild, as newspapers were permitted to publish editorials openly calling for the overthrow of the government, something that the United States historically did not tolerate very well within its own borders. Allende’s popularity can better be traced to the greater tolerance of leftist perspectives within Chilean society. Several surveys conducted by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) of Chilean students and middle class professionals revealed great sympathy for socialist solutions to the problems of

underdevelopment and foreign domination of the economy.<sup>52</sup>

Ultimately, of course, the U.S. destabilization campaign succeeded. Even a popular, charismatic, president like Allende could not withstand the battering of right-wing terrorist groups such as Patria y Libertad, CIA subterfuges, widespread social unrest, and dissension within his own ranks. The economic chaos, at least part of which can be traced to the U.S. destabilization campaign, created such a severe crisis that many observers believed by the middle of 1973 that some sort of military coup was inevitable. The Nixon administration, which had cultivated close relations with the Chilean military, had virtually no contact with Pinochet until the coup planning was well underway. In June 1971, the CIA described Pinochet as a “highly efficient subordinate officer who carries out orders explicitly” but “is unlikely to undertake action on his own accord.”<sup>53</sup> A few months later, a report described Pinochet as a “mild, friendly, narrow-gauged military man” who was unlikely to lead a coup.<sup>54</sup> His name does not appear in the U.S. diplomatic record again until mid-1973, and even then not in connection with a coup plot. Pinochet told Ambassador Davis afterward that “he and his colleagues had not even hinted to us beforehand of their developing resolve to act and said he thought it had been better that way.”<sup>55</sup>

The fact that Washington was not directing Pinochet’s every move does not mean, of course, that the United States bears no responsibility for the coup. The destabilization campaign did succeed, at least in the sense that it helped create a “coup climate.” Kissinger first insisted to Nixon that “We didn’t do it.” Then correcting himself, “I mean we helped them” by creating “the conditions as great as possible.”<sup>56</sup> In essence, the U.S. destabilization campaign against Allende demonstrated that with time and patience, even a popular leader could be ousted without having

to guide the operation closely. The Nixon administration's success in Chile also proved that Castro had been correct to advise Allende to arm the popular organizations if he wanted to survive.<sup>57</sup> Allende, who remained committed to the democratic process to the end, rejected this option because he did not want to be responsible for starting a civil war. Pinochet later justified the coup partly on the grounds that Allende's supporters had planned to assassinate opposition military and civilian leaders in what was secretly called "Plan Z."<sup>58</sup> UP leaders have denied the existence of such a plot, and only one unconfirmed U.S. intelligence report ever mentions it.<sup>59</sup> In truth, Pinochet was an opportunist who sat on the sidelines for years until it became relatively safe to launch a coup knowing that the Allende administration was defenseless and that Washington's blessings would be forthcoming.

## Endnotes

1. Kissinger telcons, 16 September 1973, Nixon Presidential Materials, U.S. National Archives [NA], College Park, MD [hereafter NPM].
2. Alfonso Bauer Paiz, a former official in the Arbenz administration who had been forced into exile also personally witnessed the coup against Allende, which he understandably interpreted as a replay of 1954. Alfonso Bauer Paiz, *Memorias de Alfonso Bauer Paiz: Historia no oficial de Guatemala* (Guatemala: Rusticatio Ediciones, 1996).
3. Accounts that defend the Nixon administration include Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 374, 393; Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile, 1961-1991* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 83.
4. James F. Petras, and Morris Morley, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); Armando Uribe Arce, *The Black Book of American Intervention in Chile* (Boston: Beacon Press), 1975.
5. White House Press Statement, 13 November 2000. U.S. Department of State FOIA website <<http://foia.state.gov/Press/WH11-13-00.asp>> . I would like to thank my Research Assistant, Diana Cucuz, for helping me download the documents into my database. The website [hereafter, DOSFOIA] is divided into various sections that are identified here as Department of State (STATE), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DOD), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
6. Hundreds of documents relating to Chile in the State Department Central files and the Nixon Presidential Library are still being withheld in their entirety.
7. This essay presents the results of the first year of a three-year research project into the overthrow of President Salvador Allende. The investigation is being funded by the Social Science Research Council of Canada.
8. Kissing telcons, 9 November 1970, NPM.
9. CIA, "800 Millions Dollars of Investments are at Stake," 10 September 1970, DOSFOIA; United States Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs [HCFA], *The United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 38-42.
10. Kissinger memo to Nixon, 29 September 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1969-1976* 1:117.
11. Korry telegram to U.S. Secretary of State [secstate], January 1970, HAK Office Files, box 128, folder Latin America, Chile Wrap Up and Post Mortem [1971], The President [1 of 1],

NPM; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [hereafter SCFR], *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 609.

12. *New York Times*, 5 July 1972.

13. Korry telegram to U.S. Secretary of State [secstate], 16 March 1970, RG 59, box 2195, folder POL 14 Chile, NA. For examples of Allende's public and private statements about the need to moderate the revolution, see Salvador Allende Gossens, *El pensamiento de Salvador Allende* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974).

14. "Options Paper for NSC Chile," 3 November 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA.

15. Stephen M. Streeter, *Managing the Counterrevolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 33.

16. Stephen M. Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives," *History Teacher* 34 (November 2000), 61-74.

17. Anthony Sampson, *The Sovereign State of ITT* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980).

18. The "Anderson papers" are reprinted in International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, *Subversion in Chile: A Case Study in U.S. Corporate Intrigue in the Third World* (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1972).

19. "Allende's Campaign Being Funded By USSR Through Cuba's Prensa Latina," 23 July 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA; "Resume of Contacts with ITT Officials Regarding Chile," 19 March 1972, CIA, DOSFOIA.

20. Tel 96050, 30 May 1972, Record Group [RG] 59, box 1150, folder INCO 15-2 Chile, 5/1/72, NA.

21. United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975).

22. Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: New Press, 2003), 14.

23. Kissinger telcons, 11 March 1971, NPM.

24. Kissinger telcons, 30 November 1970, NPM.

25. Daniel Hellinger, "Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside: The Presidential Elections of 1958 and 1970," *Western Political Quarterly* 31 (1978), 255.

26. NARA, "Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 27 June 1970," 29 June 1970, DOSFOIA.
27. Telegram 3499, 5 September 1970, RG 59, box 2195, folder POL 14 Chile, 9/1/70, NA.
28. Bureau of Intelligence and Research intelligence note RARN-43, 16 October 1970, RG 59, box 2198, folder POL 23-9 Chile, 3-25-70.
29. Both Kissinger and CIA Director William Colby claims that Congressman Michael Harrington invented the term "destabilization" to describe U.S. policy toward Chile, but they never used such terminology. Kissinger, *Years*, 382; NARA, "Subcommittee of Appropriations, 6 November 1970, NARA, DOSFOIA. Nonetheless, the term accurately describes the U.S. policy of economic, political, and psychological warfare to undermine popular support for Allende.
30. Korry, "During the Hours of September 20 Ambassador Korry Conversed with Defense Minister Sergio Ossa About the Situation in Chile," 21 September 1970, State, DOSFOIA.
31. Phillips telegram to Santiago, 28 September 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA.
32. Korry message to Crimmins, 11 August 1970, State, DOSFOIA.
33. Department of Defense Intelligence Report, 17 June 1970, DOD, DOSFOIA.
34. Kissinger, Henry, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 674; CIA tel to Santiago, 16 October 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA.
35. DIA, "Government Using Investigation to Discredit Opposition," 23 December 1970, DOD, DOSFOIA.
36. CIA, "Three Considerations Allende After the Inauguration," 21 October 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA.
37. FBI, "Months of Political Activity Following Assassination," 12 November 1970, DOD, DOSFOIA.
38. Memorandum of conversation, "NSC Meeting - Chile NSSM 97," 6 November 1970, NARA, DOSFOIA.
39. NSDM 93, 9 November 1970, NARA, DOSFOIA.
40. Ian Roxborough, Ian, *Chile: The State and Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), 131.
41. SNIE, "The Outlook for Chile Under Allende," 4 August 1970, CIA, DOSFOIA.

42. Korry to secstate, tel 3624, 12 June 1970, RG 59, box 2195, folder POL 14 Chile, 9/10/70, NA.
43. Davis to sectate, tel 6056, 11 December 1971, RG 59, box 2200, folder POL Chile - US, 6/1/71, NA.
44. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RARN-34, 25 September 1970, RG 59, box 2199, folder POL Chile - US, 1/1/70.
45. Enclosure to A-60, 22 February 1970, "Allende's Chances of Leading the Field in the Popular Vote," 22 February 1970, State, DOSFOIA.
46. Davis to secstate, tel 6056, 11 December 1971, RG 59, box 2200, folder POL Chile - US, 6/1/71, NA.
47. Memorandum of conversation (Allende, Galo Plaza), 2 November 1970, RG 59, box 2196, folder POL 15 Chile, 11-10-70, NA.
48. Korry to secstate, tel 2394, 5 May 1971, RG 59, box 2201, folder POL Chile - US, 1/1/71.
49. Santiago tel 3039, 9 June 1971, RG 59, box 2193, folder POL 2-2 Chile, NA.
50. Jerry W. Knudson, *The Chilean Press during the Allende Years, 1970-73* (Buffalo, NY: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984); Edward Tassinari, "The Chilean Mass Media During the Presidency of Salvador Allende Gossens," ( Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 1982);
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